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1.

Introduction

development and in the evolution of new
civil societies.

Some thirty years after the end of
colonial rule and over twenty years into
a period of drought and environmental
degradation, the nations of the western
Sahel have reached a critical point.
International
funders
that
largely
bankroll Sahelian states are demanding
reform
of
the
economic
and
administrative
structures
that
they
helped create.
What is more, aroused
populations in several countries are
pushing
forcefully
for
far-reaching
political reform.
Changes that seemed
distant or impossible not long ago now
appear
inevitable.
Authoritarian
governments
with
their
centralized
institutions and policies are being forced
to transform themselves rapidly or risk
being
overthrown.
A
basic
reconsideration of civil relationships is
taking shape.
Due to disillusionment with large-scale
statist
development
programs,
and
because
governments
are
now
disengaging from rural areas, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are
frequently cited as an alternative for
grassroots development efforts.
In the
long term crisis of the Sahel zone, NGOs'
emphasis on partlc1patory approaches
has
particular
significance
in
supporting improved local management
of natural resources.
National NGOs are emerging at an
accelerating rate in the West African
Sahel as in other areas of Africa.
Although the various national NGO
movements in the Sahel are only about
15 years old and are still quite fragile,
they are now attracting considerable
attention from Sahelian governments,
donors agencies, and others indi victuals
and
organizations
concerned
with
development.
The expansion of NGOs is
matched by a veritable explosion of
autonomous self-help groups among
rural producers.
Considered together,
NGOs and rural organizations are key
elements in the struggle for sustainable
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The objective of this paper is to situate
the NGO movement of the West African
Sahel within the context of the evolving
regional
situation,
with
particular
reference to the paramount concerns
for managing natural resources.
What is
the impetus for the emergence of NGOs
and rural organizations; what arc the
attributes, capacities and problems of
both NGOs and rural organizations, how
do national and foreign NGOs relate to
each other and to other institutional
actors;
what are their roles in
reshaping
local
govern an cc
of
resources;
what are the opportunities,
responsibilities and risks for NGOs at this
juncture.
These are the questions we
will attempt to address.
This survey of NGOs and other major
actors involved in natural resource
management presents an overview of
the complex institutional relationships
found in the Sahel.
In taking this focus
we will touch upon other related issues,
such as public finance, economic policy,
ethnic factors, the special problems of
rural women, pre-colonial history, and
technical aspects of agro/silvo/pastoral
production systems, among many others.
Although the focus .on institutions
emphasizes
political
factors,
this
emphasis
in
no
way
denies
the
environmental, economic, demographic
and other factors contributing to the
current crisis in the Sahel.
It is hoped
that this overview of relationships
among institutional actors will open the
door
to
further,
more
integrated
investigation of relationship dynamics
and to better understanding of how
improved relationships can improve the
management of natural resources.
This paper is intended to be provocative
and critical of the way key institutional
actors have behaved.
It
is not
prescriptive in specific technical, policy
or program terms. The analysis is biased
by a conviction that the enduring
Sahelian crisis can only be solved if the

actual resource users regain a major role
in the local governance of land, water,
forests and other resources.
The debate
over control of natural resources is
profound.
It ant1c1pates fundamental
redistribution of authority including the
empowerment of local institutions.
Little by little the notion of rural
populations
re-acquiring
tenurial
control over natural resources, which
prior to the colonial era was in the
hands
of
indigenous
states
and
communities, is gaining credence.
At
this point it cannot be proven that a
return to greater local control will lead
to better resource management.
The
failure of resource management based
on usurped authority by colonial and
post-colonial
governments,
however,
underscores the importance of detailed
knowledge of loca~ environments and
management
approaches
adapted
to
highly
variable patterns of human
production and resource use.
to
pre-colonial
A complete return
management structures that were based
on extensive production systems is
neither possible nor desirable.
A new
set of structures must be created.
NGOs
and the communities they work with are
evolving
autonomous
organizational
structures
and
testing
innovative
approaches to local control of renewable
natural resources.
These developments
arc still scattered, tentative, and often
not well documented;
yet they may
contain the seeds of rural renewal for
this devastated region.
After a brief presentation of concepts
and definitions, this survey begins with
an
introduction
of
the
major
ins ti tu ti on al
actors:
governments,
donors, NGOs and rural organizations.
Certain aspects of the historical context
are then reviewed before we move on to
explore relationships among the actors.
Given the importance of mutual support
among NGOs, our attention turns to the
issue of solidarity among NGOs. Next we
consider relationships among NGOs and
other actors involved in the area of
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natural resource management.
We close
with brief remarks of the possibilities
for
reform
in
natural
resource
management.
To simplify matters somewhat the focus
is on just a few Sahelian nations, Mali,
Senegal, Burkina Faso and Niger, with
secondary references to neighboring
states.
Even with this narrowing of
focus the range the subject is vast, and
this survey is far from exhaustive.
A
liberal use of examples and short case
studies are employed to indicate the
range and variation of actors and issues
that cannot be explored in more detail in
this overview.
Concents and definitions
Sahel, an Arabic word meaning edge or
border, is applied with varying degrees
of precision to the arid and semi-arid
lands that stretch across Africa just
south of the Sahara.
As a geographic
term the Sahel encompasses all or parts
of about 20 countries, from Cape Verde,
Senegal, the Gambia and Mauritania on
the Atlantic Ocean to Sudan, Ethiopia and
Somalia on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
These
Saharan
borderlands
are
characterized by low levels of rainfall
unevenly distributed in a brief rainy
season.
For all its surface uniformity, the Sahel
region
contains
great
ecosystem
complexity and corresponding variation
in human activity.
Its arid and semi-arid
lands are home to mobile and sedentary
pastoralists, farmers of rainfed and
irrigated crops, fisher folk, hunters,
oasis dwellers and many other nonexclusive categories of people exploiting
a
bewildering
array
of
microenvironments.
Before the colonial era, a
functional interdependence of desert
and savannah zones, and stable systems
for controlled use of natural resources,
contributed
to
the
maintenance of
ecological balance in the fragile ncardesert environment of the Sahel (Baier).

Wetter and drier periods have alternated
throughout recorded Sahelian history.
Droughts lasting as long as thirty years
have been chronicled in the northern
Sahel as early as the fifteenth century.
In the West African Sahel it appears that
taken as a whole the twentieth century
may be the most arid in over a thousand
years.
Agricultural expansion into
marginal lands during a period of
consistently high rainfall throughout
the 1950s and early 1960s has had tragic
consequences
during
the
prolonged
period of sub-normal precipitation that
has followed.
Severe widespread drought
has occured twice in the West African
Sahel in recent years, from 1968-1974
and again in the early 1980's, further
exacerbating the degradation of this
ecologically fragile region (BOSTID;
Baier),
Beginning in the late 1960's the term
Sahel increasingly came to connote the
drought-stricken
countries
of
West
Africa.
It was officially appropriated by
these countries in 1973 when they
formed the regional agency Comite
Permanent lnter-Etats de Lutte contre la
Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), the
Permanent Inter-State Committee for
Drought Control in the Sahel.
CILSS
membership now includes Burkina Faso,
Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, GuineaBissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and
Senegal.
Thus, the Sahel has become a
West African geo-political entity, and
this is how we will use the term in this
paper unless noted otherwise.
In the Sahel, natural resources are
commonly considered to comprise both
physical
and
biological
systems
associated with agricultural lands, range
lands, forests and water.
By using the
word
management, attention is focused
on how human decisions effect the
environment for better and worse.
The
construct
of
natural
resource
management, NRM, might be seen as
occupying some middle ground between
the "frontier economics" mentality of
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unlimited growth and domination of the
environment, and the "deep ecology" nogrowth philosophy that subordinates
humans to nature (Colby).
A focus on NRM moves beyond limitless
exploitation on the one hand and
absolute environmental protection on
the other to take a cautious and practical
view of how human needs can be met in
the present without sacrificing future
possibilities for sustained resource use.
Proper
NRM
leads
to
sustainable
development.
NRM, as used rn this
paper, cuts across many sectors or
activities, such as agriculture, range
management,
or
soil
and
water
conservation.
The discussion of NRM
encourages analysis of who controls
management
decisions,
for
whose
benefit,
with
what
incentives
for
sustainable use.
In this paper we arc
particularly concerned with local level
governance of natural resources:
the
rule
systems,
decision-making
arrangements
and
arbitration
institutions that permit rational use of
specific resources on a local level
(Thomson; Otto 1988).
Linked to an analysis of NRM is the
concept
of
decent r a 1 i z at ion of
government structures,
In order for
any
kind
of
modern
resource
management system to work effectively
a
certain
level
of
government
involvement is required to legitimate
management regimes, ajudicatc disputes
and enforce decisions.
To make local
level management of natural resources
possible,
some
of
these
authority
functions
must
be
available
at
reasonable cost and within a reasonable
distance of the resource users.
In other
words, user-based governance of natural
resources requires a well-articulated
network
of
officially
sanctioned
authorities backing up the community
level bodies in their exercise of resource
management.
While decentralization is now widely
used as a generic term for any transfer

of authority or responsibility outside of
the central government, four distinct
kinds of decentralization can be noted.
Deconcentration is the handing over of
some authority to lower levels within the
centralized structure.
Delegation refers
to transfers of defined functions to
organizations
outside
the
regular
bureaucratic
structure,
such
as
parastatals.
Dev o I u ti on implies the
creation or strengthening of local units
of government with their own legal
status, with limited executive, legislative
and fiscal authority, such as state or
town government.
A fourth kind of
decentralization
pertains
to
the
divestment of certain responsibilities to
voluntary
agencies
or
private
enterprises which is sometimes known
as privatization (Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema).
Decentralization, often used in an
intentionally vague way, has become a
rallying cry for giving more power to
the people. At times it is acclaimed as the
panacea for the problems of overly
centralized
governments.
Yet,
decentralization in developing countries
has rarely lived up to expectations.
In
many countries it was never seriously
implemented or was followed by recentralization because the ruling elites
found concentrated power served their
purposes better (Rondinelli, Nellis and
Cheema).
Many Sahelian states have some level of
deconcentration.
Workloads and minor
level of authority are shifted outside the
capital city, but remain within the
centralized
government
structure.
Delegation has been used quite widely in
the Sahel, often under pressure from
international donors, as a way of
circumventing
unresponsive
and
inflexible
government
bureaucracies.
Assumptions of delegation are that semiautonomous
organizations
will
be
managed in a more efficient manner and
can provide better accounting for funds.
Devolution
to
autonomous
local
government
units,
which
implies
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popular election of representatives on
governing
bodies,
has
seen
little
application in CILSS member nations.
Privatization
must
be
broken
into
several categories to be useful in
considering
natural
resource
management in the Sahel.
One category
is the divestment of state-owned or stateoperated
businesses, functions and
services to private · entities.
Across
Africa, this taking place under the
rigors
of
structural
adjustment
programs.
Privatization also takes place
when voluntary organizations, under
specific government agreement, assume
responsibility for delivery of services.
Examples
include
an
independent
farmers' cooperative, credit association
or a professional group which is
sanctioned
to
take
over
functions
previously performed by the state.
It is
probably not useful to consider the
broad sweep of services provided by
NG Os
and
other
development
organizations in their project activities
as privatization unless such service
provision is the subject of specific
authority and responsibility negotiated
with the government.
Privatization is now taking place in
many areas of the Sahel, as governments
disengage from rural areas without
always providing full assessment of local
capacities to assure orderly transfer of
services and functions to others.
In
some cases this might better be termed
abandonment, for the process has not
left
privately-controlled,
sanctioned
structures in place that arc capable of
filling the government's former roles.
One
other
category
of
privatized
authority that is of special interest in
considering
local
management
of
natural resources is the transfer of NRM
resource
authority to locally constituted
user groups. Re-privatization might be a
better term for a process which returns
to rural people what once was theirs: the
self-management of local
resources.
Pre-colonial
NRM
structures
were

eclipsed in this century and were
partially superseded by centralized state
authority, with disastrous results.
The
re-privatization of the management of
natural resources means re-empowering
groups of the actual resource users.
Ideally, these local NRM structures will
include a variety of interrelated, sitespecific,
user-designed
institutional
arrangements that take into account
overlapping and sequential uses of
lands, water points and other resources
by different user groups.
Such NRM
structures
would
provide
tenurial
security to users as security provides the
inc en ti ves for investment in protection
and
enhancement
of
resources
(Thomson; Otto 1990).
To
revitalize
and
empower
these
resource user arrangements will require
more than political will and financial
resources
to
create
congruent
structures. It will require understanding
and
appreciation
of
indigenous
knowledge systems and resource users'
relationships; it will require building
confidence of the rural resource users
in a decentralization process which
genuinely seeks to empower them.
And
it
will
require
a
period
of
experimentation,
training
and
institution building.
NGOs can play
important roles in this process. Let us
now move on to introductions of the
NGOs and the other actors in this scene.
2.

The

Institutional

Actors

In
order to
understand
the
NGO
movement in context, we need to identify
the main actors and look at their
changing relationships.
The decision to
concentrate on these· four .institutional
actors
governments, donors, rural
organizations and NGOs -- does not infer
that other forces are not also at work
This limited focus is not intended
here.
to minimize the importance of political
parties, trade unions, private sector
entities,
student
associations,
professional
groups,
class-based
organizations and other interest groups.
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We concentrate on these particular
actors because of their importance in
understanding the institutional context
of the NGO movement in the Sahel.
Introductions are in order.
Goyernments
The present Sahelian governments arc
the inheritors of colonial
political
boundaries and centralized power. Some
governments have enjoyed long periods
of relative ·stability, though it is the
stability
of
authoritarian
military
regimes in most cases. Senegal alone has
maintained
a
level
of multi-party
electoral democracy.
Other countries
have
at
least
experimented
with
parliamentary systems.
Most West Africa Sahelian nations have
not suffered the civil wars that plague
countries on the eastern end of the
continental Sahel zone including Sudan,
Ethiopia and Somalia. Chad's civil war is
major
exception
among
CILSS
a
members.
Guinea-Bissau suffered years
of
devastation
before
winning
independence in 1974.
Recent years
have witnessed a resurgence of internal
conflicts in Mali and Niger between
Tuareg groups and central governments,
and a smoldering secessionist movement
in the Casamance of southern Senegal.
Inter-country
conflicts
within
the
western
Sahel
are
also
infrequent,
although
recent
clashes
between
Senegal
and
Mauritania
caused
considerable disruption and loss of life.
Mauritania was also embroiled 111 the
struggle over territory of the former
Spanish Sahara.
A minor border dispute
between Mali and Burkina Faso flared up
a few years ago.
For the most part the
CILSS countries have had f cw major
conflicts.
Increasingly governments of the West
African Sahel arc facing strong demands
from students, trade unions and other
civil groups to make major reforms.
In
Cape Verde, the ruling government

turned over power in 1990 after losing
the first multi-party national election, a
rare political event among sub-Saharan
countries.
Burkina Faso's military
regime has been pushed to promote a
democratic constitution in 1990 and to
hold elections in 1991.
Niger suffered
fatal confrontations between protestors
and police in 1990 and its government
has been pressured to hold multi-party
elections.
In 1991 Mali's long-standing
military regime was toppled in a bloody
popular
upnsrng
when
it
refused
demands for more democracy.
Whether
this represents fall-out from the historic
changes of Eastern Europe or the
culmination of frustration from decades
of
dictatorial
rule
and
economic
stagnation, the ruling elites of the Sahel
are under enormous pressure to reform
the relationship between governments
and citizens.

Secretariats play a central role in
promoting
regional
discussions
and
providing guidance to decision makers,
with environmental and productivity
issues high among their prionties.
CILSS and Club du Sahel fund research,
publish high quality documents and in
general attempt to influence policies
relating to a range of issues.
There are other categories of donors that
we will not consider directly, although
they are important for NGOs and rural
organizations in some countries.
Thus
we exclude private donors like the Ford
Foundation.
Also excluded are agencies
related to foreign governments but not
usually involved in macro-level policy
formation having to do with official aid,
such
as
the
African
Development
Foundation
of
the
US,
and
the
International
Development
Research
Center, IDRC, of Canada.

Donors
Donor in this paper refers to those
bilateral governmental and multilateral
inter-governmental
agencies
that
contribute
financial
and
technical
resources
to
support
Sahelian
governments and development efforts in
these countries. Among these major
donors are the Canadian International
Development Agcncy(CIDA), the US
Agency for International Development
(AID), the European Community's Fonds
Europeen de Devcloppement (FED), and
the
French
Caisse
Cen tralc
de
Cooperation Economiquc (CCCE).
The
World Bank is also a major donor. The
United Nations family of agencies is well
represented in the Sahel by the United
Nations
Development
Programme
(UNDP), and the UN Sudano-Sahclian
office (UNSO), among others.
In counterpart to the Sahelian intergovernmental agency CILSS, a number
of bilateral donor organizations formed
the Club du Sahel in 1976 as a link
between
CILSS
members
and
the
northern countries that arc active in
this region. The CILSS and Club du Sahel
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Each donor has its own constituencies,
including
national
parliaments
for
bilateral donors, which impose their
own demands and expectations.
The US
Congress, for example, puts earmarks or
funding targets on its appropriations to
ensure that a given percentage of
foreign assistance is spent via NGOs, or
that a certain sum is spent on supporting
natural resource management in Africa.
Funding levels may jump (or drop) by
hundreds of millions of dollars in one
year, as recently happened with AID's
Development Fund for Africa.
With next
year's funding dependant on complete
obligation and accurate accounting of
this year's allocation, the institutional
imperative for donor agency personnel
is to move money rapidly with maximum
case of monitoring. The result is a bias
for large scale, low risk, short term,
equipment-intensive
projects
with
easily measured results that arc managed
by established bureaucracies
(Ostrom,
Schroeder and Wynne).
This bias in donor
be at odds with the
level improvements
management.

modalities appears to
requirements of local
in natural resource
Such
efforts
are

generally small, experimental, laborintensive, long term, and not always
amenable to quantifiable verification.
Improved NRM often entail providing
resources to new and inexperienced
groups.
A central component of
improved NRM is institution building or
capacity strengthening, from the level
of resource users on up to regional and
national entities.
Such institutional
reinforcement is often slow going and
not physically impressive.
Non-goyernmental

Organizations

CNGO)

NGOs in this paper includes those
agencies known in the U.S. as Private
Voluntary
Organizations
(PVOs),
in
French
as
Organisations
NonGouvernementales (ONG), as Volunteer
Development Organizations (VDOs), in
some African circles and as NGOs in most
of the world. NGO was first used in the
1940's by the UN to differentiate
voluntary
non-governmental
agencies
from
governmental
and
intergovernmental organizations.
Each of these terms has nuanced
differences in meaning.
The word
voluntary
in
PVO
denotes
the
significance of voluntary contributions
from the private sources as opposed to
government funding, even though most
PVOs receive funding from both. VDO is
a term recently coined by certain
African
NGOs
to
emphasize
the
importance of volunteerism or freedom
of participation in their organizations,
and to avoid any negative or antigovernmental connotation attached to
the term non-governmental.
While
naming is in itself a important process,
VDO has yet to become widely used
among Sahelian groups.
The more
broadly applicable collective term of NGO
will
be
retained
here,
with
the
understanding that we are talking about
development agencies rather than those
which are essentially cultural, social or
political in purpose.
The adjectives
northern, international, external
and
foreign arc used almost interchangeably
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to denote NGOs whose headquarters and
primary registration are outside the
country under discussion.
Finally, we
will use the term national rather than
indigenous when refering to Sahelian
NGOs, due to the pejorative connotation
of a similar sounding French word,
indigcne (FAVDO;
Mulyungi).
Several
categories
of organizations
closely resemble NGOs in purpose and
program,
such
as
independent
cooperatives and non-profit research
groups.
Government registration is
often the easiest way of distinguishing
NGOs from these fellow travelers.
The principle source of financial and
technical cooperation for national NGOs
in
the
Sahel
has
been
through
partnerships
with
their
external
counterparts, northern NGOs.
The
consideration
of both
African
and
foreign NGOs is not meant to deemphasize
the
distinctions
between
Sahel national and foreign NGOs in terms
of size, resources, legal status, agenda or
other descriptors.
Rather, the strong
interdependence
and
working
partnerships that link many Sahclian
and external NGOs makes it appropriate
to study them in tandem.
National NGOs can be considered in
several broad categories, each with
variations. One category consists of
professional or service NGOs set up to
provide
services
to
particular
beneficiary or client groups.
Their
beneficiaries are most often groups
rather than individuals, such as a
farmers' association or a group of
women
involved
111
dry
season
gardening.
Services
may
include
tra111111g, technical assistance, research,
small grants and loans to beneficiaries.
Sometimes these service NGOs arc set up
as membership organizations.
Members
provide guidance and resources, but do
not benefit directly.
For example, a
group of people from a particular village
or district who arc living in the capital
city may launch an NGO to benefit their
home district.

In many cases national service NGOs
function in much the same way as
external NGOs that provide such services.
The vast majority of these national NGOs
depend on financial resources generated
from
outside sources. While these
sources are typically northern NGOs, a
few national NGOs are now attracting
bilateral and multilateral donors.
An
important element in the definition of
an NGO is its not-for-profit nature.
As
NGOs
strive
for
greater
financial
independence,
however,
they
are
looking for creative ways of balancing
their non-profit status and spirit with
the desire to earn income from their
services. Some NGOs are experimenting
with fee-for-service contracts with their
client groups, especially when income
generating activities are involved.
A prime example of a successful service
NGO is RADI, Reseau Africaine pour le
Developpement
Integre,
(African
Network for Integrated Development),
based in Dakar.
Working directly with
grassroots organizations, many of RADI's
activities arc related to NRM and income
generation in irrigated agriculture, food
processing,
and
animal
husbandry.
Local
institutional
development
is
emphasized through training seminars
and internships.
To diversify its own
financial base and to assist client groups
with low-cost commercial services, RADI
has
set up
two
income-generating
affiliates.
RADI/COM
offers
transportation of produce to regional
markets
for
farmers,
while
RADl/MECHANIQUE
contracts
with
groups or individuals to repair and
maintain water pumps and other small
equipment.
RADI is also exploring the
possibility
of
providing
financial
management and accounting services to
other national NGOs, a much needed
service for young organizations.
Having
launched its operations in Senegal, RADI
now has activities in Guinea-Bissau and
Mali, and plans a measured expansion
into other areas (Booth and Ly).
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A second category of national NGOs is
comprised of membership organizations
which are created to meet members'
needs or use member's professional
skills.
Membership may be limited to
only a few people or may include
hundreds.
Examples include NGOs made
up of unemployed young people seeking
work
in
development,
like
the
Association Malienne pour l'Insertion
Professionnelle
des
Jeunes/Groupes
Jeunes, an associat10n for professional
placement of young people in Mali and
the Association des Bacheliers pour
Emploi
et
le
Developpement,
an
association of graduates for work and
development in Senegal.
Note that such
NGOs have programs to serve their
members, although their activities may
also benefit others.
There is an important distinction to be
made between national NGOs and formal
or informal community groups at the
local level which we will discuss in the
Prior to the recent
following section.
emergence of national NGOs, community
groups were sometimes refered to as
"local NGOs" but this nomenclature is
One main distinction
now misleading.
between national NGOs and community
groups is that in most countries they
have completely different legal status
and registration requirements.
Other
elements
which
distinguish
national NGOs from community-based
organizations
have
to
do
with
institutional
vision,
level
of
organization, and base of support. NGOs,
as the term is currently used, share a
They often operate
national perspective.
multiple act1v1lles in several regions.
Their paid professional staff reporls to a
separate board of directors and the
whole organization depends on outside
financial support.
Community groups
typically have a local perspective and a
local agenda of specific needs.
Their
base is centered within their constituent
membership in terms of decision making
and financial support, i.e., membership
dues,
which
in
some
cases
are
significantly augmented by funds from

local migrant workers in urban areas.
Their leadership is usually unpaid,
chosen or elected from among the group
and their management systems are very
basic.
Even when community groups
grow to considerable size, attract outside
funding and hire staff, their locus of
interests and actions remains local.
Community groups do sometimes form a
larger federation or association of
individual groups, and this federation
may then be registered as an NGO. These
groups
band
together
to
form
a
federation for reasons of solidarity, fund
ra1smg,
advocacy
and
advancement.
This represents another type of NGO.
The membership groupings in Senegal
demonstrates this possibility.
NGO
membership
groupings
may
be
organized on a regional basis, such as
the Federation des Associations du Fouta
pour le Developpement which serves the
Fouta region.
Other federations are
organized by constituency, such as
women's advancement in the Federation
des Associations Feminines du Senegal,
or by professional interest such as the
Association des Jeunes Agricultureurs de
la Casamance, AJAC, which represents
120 groups of farmers.
A national
coordinating
organization
for
community organizations in Senegal,
FONGS, Federation des Organisations NonGouvernementales du Senegal, is an
organization that has a membership of
regional and departmental associations
of community groups like AJAC. FONGS
membership
is
comprised
of
17
associations of community groups with
175,000 total members (Booth and Ly).
Foreign NGOs define their tasks and
methodology in many different ways,
making categorization difficult.
For our
purposes one key
characteristic of
external NGOs involves the manner in
which they relate to national agencies,
particularly Sahelian NGOs.
On one end
of the spectrum, some external NGOs set
up operational programs to implement
activities themselves at the village or
sub-regional level without a national
partner agency.
On the other end of the

9

spectrum are external NGOs that have no
permanent
presence
in-country,
and
function
uniquely
as
providers
of
financial assistance to national or local
organizations which carry out their own
programs. In between these extremes is
an array of partnership arrangements
among external and national NGOs.
These partnership arrangements may
include staff training and technical
assistance
with
or
without
direct
financial assistance for the Sahelian
partner;
or, financial assistance may
come through joint implementation of
activities.
An
example
of
such
north-south
partnership
involving
NRM
is
the
relationship between Ouevre Malienne
d'Aide a l'Enfance du Sahel, OMAES, a
national NGO, and World Education Inc.,
WEI, based in Boston. OMAES was begun
in
1982
essentially
by
Malian
government
functionaries
living
in
Bamako who wanted to contribute to the
development of the Tinankou area of
central Mali.
Within two years their
group was legally recognized by the
government, had engaged a voluntary
Permanent Secretary, and was looking
for partners to help them get started
with field activities.
WEI, which had
limited previous experience working in
Mali, was looking for a· national partner.
In 1985, OMAES teamed up with WEI,
which
agreed
to
help
with
organizational
development
and
management training for the OMAES
board of directors, regional development
committees and staff.
Working together, WEI and OMAES
designed a program of wells and
irrigated gardening in Tinankou which
received funding from two US-based
agencies.
One atypical aspect of this
north-south NGO partnership was that
OMAES, with WEI's assistance, secured its
own direct funding because one of the
donors, USA for Africa, prefered to
support national organizations directly.
In
this
mutually
beneficial
arrangement, WEI had the opportunity
to learn about the Malian environment,

to use its professional skills, and to
establish its reputation as the base for an
expanded
program.
Through
its
relationship with WEI, OMAES was able to
strengthen
its
young
organization,
engage salaried staff, and gain the
experience of implementing a sizeable
project.
The nature of. relationships between
northern and southern NGOs has been
on the agenda of a growing list of
national
and
international
meetings
among NGOs. The range of this dialogue
within the NGO movement is illustrated
by cttmg a few such encounters,
beginning with the 1987 landmark World
Development/ Overseas
Development
Institute Symposium of NGO leaders from
around
the
world.
A
two-year
examination of NGO partnerships across
Africa
that
invol.ved
a
series
of
encounters in Africa and North America
was recently co-sponsored by the Forum
for
African Voluntary
Development
Organizations, FA VDO, and the American
Council
for Voluntary
International
Action, InterAction.
On the level of the
Sahel, NGO leaders from Canada, US and
seven Sahelian countries were joined by
European NGO leaders and a few donor
representatives for a November 1990
conference in Quebec on "Partnership
and
Local
Participation
in
the
Management of Natural Resources in the
Sahel."
On a national level, the Malian
NGO consortium CCA-ONG and the AIDfunded PVO/NGO Initiatives Project
recently organized a week-long Seminar
on Partnership in Mali.

improved awareness and efforts
at
equality in these partnerships are noted
(Drabek;
FAVDO and InterAction;
SCS
1990; Datex).
One other form of partnership that is
getting more and more attention is
south-south relationships, and regional
cooperation among African NGOs.
A
major step in this direction was the
founding in 1987 bf the Forum for
African
Voluntary
Development
Organizations, FA VDO, a pan-African
grouping which has its headquarters in
Dakar.
In the NRM area, African NGOs
have
formed
the
African
NG Os
Environmental Network (ANEN), which
is based in Nairobi and has member NGOs
in almost all African countries that allow
national NGOs.
Preliminary efforts to
form a Sahel regional grouping of NGOs
have not yet produced results, but there
is an increasing number of functional
connections, especially at the level of
the national consortia of NGOs.
These
consortia, while not exclusively made up
of African NGOs, play a lead role in
promoting national NGOs, as discussed in
the section on NGO solidarity.
As
national NGO commun1ttes develop in
Sahelian countries, their desire to open
direct channels for communication, to
discuss and conduct research on topics of
regional significance, and to relate to
specialized regional bodies like CILSS,
may well lead to the formation of some
form
of
regular
regional
NGO
cooperation (FAVDO;
Kinyanjui).
Rural

The literature that is coming out of such
events
analyzes
the
complexities,
difficulties and importance of creating
and maintammg equitable relationships
of mutual trust.
Both northern and
southern NGOs deplore the competition
among
NGOs that is fostered
by
perceptions of compet1t1on for funds.
Southern NGOs express considerable
frustration
at
their
financial
dependency on northern NGOs, and at
the lack of transparency in many of
these relationships.
At the same time,
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Organizations

Rural organization, RO, refers to a wide
variety
of
formal
and
informal
institutions, from
traditional mutual
assistance groupings to multi-purpose
new
associations.
Terminology
commonly used in English includes
peasant
organizations,
community
organizations,
village
associations,
farmer
groups,
producer
groups,
grassroots development organizations,
among other terms, and in French by

association
des
jeunes,
comite
villageoise,
entite
autonomes
de
developpement, groupement villageoise
and
association
villageoise
de
developpement, among others.
By
selecting the term rural organization we
mean to include a broad range of local
institutions that are made up of rural
people
orgamzrng
to
solve
their
problems, either on their own or with
outside impetus.
Typologies have been suggested for
citizen organizations, both urban and
rural,
with contrasting criteria for
inclusion and exclusion. One might
choose to categorize such organizations
according to their objectives, range of
activities, membership, authority base or
legal status (Esman and Uphoff '84).
There are few specific qualities that can
be used to describe Sahelian ROs. For our
purposes, we are most interested in
organizations created and managed by a
local group whose interests they are
meant to serve, and which work in some
aspect of NRM.
These ROs are distinct
from
government
sponsored
organizations, such as cooperatives that
are government controlled or local
affiliates of a political party in a oneparty state.
Rather, the emphasis is on
self-help
groups
which
have been
established
by
groups
of
people
attempting to deal with the deteriorating
social, economic and
environmental
realities of the Sahel. In fact, this crisis
situation seems to be a driving force in
the emergence of new ROs (OECD 1988;
Ba)
One dichotomy among ROs distinguishes
those that are self-initiated and those
that are induced by outside forces.
However, since few ROs are set up
completely
independent
of
other
influences, this distinction might best be
considered as a continuum along which
most ROs can be located.
Many ROs,
spawned by government or development
agencies, subsequently move towards
autonomy of purpose and program.
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What
scattered
data
are
available
indicate
a
rapid
expansion
of
organizations of many types.
Far from
the uninformed image of a immobile
peasantry passively accepting its fate or
waiting
for
government
top-down
instructions, the Sahel is experiencing a
surge of new autonomous organizations.
These organizations are often capable of
analyzing their problems and defining
their
support
needs.
They
guard
jealously
their
independence
while
welcoming non-controlling
assistance
(Republique du Senegal 1989b;
Hochet;
Ba).
Definition of ROs remains an issue. Some
mutual assistance act1v1t1es, such as
savings clubs or seasonal work groups,
may never become organized in a formal
sense and arc often undervalued.
Also,
there
arc
times
that
an
entire
community may function temporarily as
a development unit for a particular task.
Perhaps the only viable definition of an
RO is the self-definition that the group
selects for itself.
The purposes and acllv1t1cs of ROs cover
the range of rural concerns, with an
emphasis on the major preoccupation of
greater food security.
Given the central
role of agriculture, many ROs arc groups
of farmers.
Frequently such groups arc
geared
toward
collectively
securing
inputs and services which arc then used
as each individual secs fit.
Cereal banks
have also been a favorite focus of ROs, as
they try to assure that sufficient grain
will
be
available
in
the
village
throughout the year at a reasonable
price.
In Burkina Faso, where NGOs
launched the first cereal banks in 1973,
20% of all villages now run a grain
bank.
Many ROs form around the need
for local health care, al though this
single aet1v1ty may not sustain the
group.
Health focused groups that have
been able to survive the difficult first
stages of training and organizing have
established rudimentary health posts
that become part of village life. Literacy
classes,
school
construction,
social
services and technical training arc also

common activities of ROs. In the village
of Oussouye in southern Senegal, a
citizens group built a handsome child
care center to resolve a major problem
when mothers arc required to work in
the rice fields (Snrcch; Ba).
The early origins of rural groupings are
considered in the historical section
below.
The
movement
towards
independent ROs took off at the end of
the 1968-1974 drought.
The breakdown
of pre-existing structures that began in
the colonial era was accelerated through
the turmoil of drought, disaster and
displacement. This created the social
space for new community structures in
rural areas.
The RO movement received
further impetus through governmental
disengagement from many services and
long held roles in rural development
during in the 1980s (OECD 1988).
In the mid-1970s in Burkina Faso, the
repeated failures of attempts to set up
centrally
controlled
local
structures
finally led the government to encourage
a
new
form
of
local
structure,
groupements villageoises, (GV).
In some
regions GVs themselves were virtually
imposed in standardized fashion, while
in others they seem to have evolved into
By 1979 there were
self-directed ROs.
3800 GV, with an estimated 6000 in 1988
(SPONG).
The origins of ROs can be attributed to
Certainly a major early
many factors.
impetus for launching ROs was the
arrival of foreign NGOs with famine
relief supplies. The drought itself also
convinced farmers to look for new
survival strategies, such as banding
together into ROs.
Many ROs have been
encouraged or even set up by NGOs
looking for local partners. Some ROs are
created by charismatic local leaders or
retired public servants who have rallied
other people around their vision and
enthusiasm.
Migrant workers returning
from Ghana or Cote d'Ivoire bring back
their experiences with self-help groups
and apply them in the Sahel.
One
Burkinabe RO that is discussed below was
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started by eleven young men trying to
figure how to get a football for their
village team.
More compelling are
accounts of women's ROs formed in
desperation to fight soil erosion in order
to save their families and salvage their
way of life (Snrech;
Mercoiret).
Quite a few ROs are composed largely or
completely of women.
Such groups often
included all the women in a community,
giving these united women a stronger
voice in community affairs. Women have
played the major role in organizing
many
anti-desertification
activities,
despite the fact that women's access to
land is severely circumscribed.
Once
they are organized into ROs women
begin
to
consider
new
economic
act1v1t1es that their combined strength
makes possible:
a small savings
program, petty commerce, cereal banks,
or the purchase of a grinding mill or
agriculture equipment.
In one case, the
women of a cooperative on Santiago
Island, Cape Verde set up a tree nursery,
produced 10,000 seedlings, sold them to
the forestry service, and plan to repeat
the process.
In another case, the
women's group of Achram in Mauritania
opened a restaurant along the national
highway
a giant step forward for
women long isolated in their tents
(Monimart).
While many ROs are individual village
level organizations, others are part of
larger groupings.
Two
Burkinabe
examples
indicate
some
of
the
possibilities.
Association Vive le Paysan
(A VLP), was started in 1979 by a rural
football team, and had grown into an
organization with over 2000 dues-paying
members in 58 villages of the Sapone
department.
Under the slogan of "Millet
and Water for Everybody" AVLP slowly
expanded into supporting group-selected
activities such as a credit scheme,
construction of anti-erosion rock bunds
called
diguettes,
a pharmacy,
and
welding shop, among others.
Fifteen
millet grinding mills are managed and
maintained completely by association
women.
Since the association is

convinced that cultural development is
also
important,
the
modest
A VLP
quarters in Sapone include a dance floor
where both modern and traditional
music is heard.
The association has a
strongly democratic constitution and
operating style.
Far in advance of most
other ROs, A VLP has developed a high
level of internal management, and its
members recently approved a threeyear program plan.
A VLP leaders will
gladly share their experience with rural
populations elsewhere, but A VLP will
remain focused in its own region
(AVLP).
In contrast to the self-imposed spatial
limits of AVLP is the Naam movement
which is based on the traditional Mossi
village organization of the same name.
One of the pioneers in the rapid
expansion of rural organizations in 1967,
the Naam movement has grown to
thousands
of
chapters
across
the
country, and has aided similar self-help
groupings
get
started
in
Senegal,
Mauritania, Niger and other countries.
The movement's methodolgy is to build
on customary mutual assistance groups
that are helped to carry out activities
selected and managed by the groups
themselves.
In the field of NRM, these
have included soil conservation, cereal
banks, irrigation dams and reforestation,
among others. To aid the growing Naam
movement, an international NGO was set
up in 1976 whose name catches the
potential for better utilization of the
long dry season, (Six "S", Se Servir de la
Saison Seche en Savanne et au Sahel),
making use of the dry season in the
Savannah and the Sahel.
The Naam
movement, however, remains solidly
based in the villages (Harrison).
The actual number of ROs in the Sahel is
unknown.
Many are unregistered and
the movement is constantly growing.
Burkina is perhaps the leading country,
with estimates ranging up to 10,000.
Senegal counts 800-1000 registered ROs
with many more unregistered.
Figures
are probably lower for Mali and other
countries.
Only a small percentage of
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the entire rural population is involved
in ROs and they are distributed quite
unevenly.
Taking the most optimistic
estimate of 15,000 Sahelian ROs, and
calculating 50 to 80 members per group,
one might estimate that at most one
million people, or under ten percent of
all rural Sahelians, participate in some
kind of organized group (Snrcch).
Many ROs are poorly organized and
managerially weak.
Some ROs arc not
representative;
after
all,
rural
communities
contain
disparities
in
wealth and status based on gender,
seniority,
social
class
and
ethnic
grouping.
Despite these realities, the
emergence of locally controlled groups
is widely considered to be one of the few
bright spots in the bleak picture of rural
development in the Sahel.
The levels of
inter-group cohesion
and
federation
already reached in Senegal, which were
noted above, may indicate the future
potential for ROs if they are given the
political space and outside assistance
they need. At the very least, the ROs of
today are a testing ground for building
experience and capacities towards sclfdefined organizations and an eventual
return of resource management control
to local levels.
In closing this bric"f introduction of
rural organizations, there is another
kind
of
rural
institution
to
be
remembered. Somewhat outside of the
framework
of
organizational
cooperation, but nonetheless crucial to
natural resource management in the
Sahel, are the rules and relationships
that have traditionally governed the
allocation of local resources among rural
populations.
These decision-making
arrangements regulating the intra- and
inter-group behavior of resource users
are, in effect, institutions.
They have
been officially
ignored, superseded,
partially abandoned, and recently rediscovered as potential assets in the
struggle
for
environmental
rehabilitation
Such local governance
regimes, both newly negotiated ones and
those
of long-standing,
should
be

considered
along
with
ROs
as
instruments for user-based management
of community lands, water and other
resources
(Thomson).

3.

The Historical Context

Our consideration of the current status
of NGOs,
their partners
and
the
environment in which they function
must include an appreciation of the
colonial and early post-colonial eras.
This condensed historical review will
also give us a chance to consider the
impact of colonial policies and practices
on
the
environment.
After
this
overview, the origins of official attempts
to organize the rural population will be
summarized, followed by a historical
note on the arrival of foreign NGOs and
the creation of the national NGO
movement.

Colonial policies and practices
The impact of the colonial era in the
area of natural resource management
began roughly
a century ago and
continues today. After several centuries
of European coastal contact based largely
on slave trade, the French began a
military occupation of the western Sahel
around the turn of the century.
Well
documented
influences
on
the
environmental decline of the Sahel in
this period include the cultivation of
exportable
cash
crops,
particularly
peanuts
and
cotton,
forced
labor,
obligatory
centralized
grain
storage
schemes, controlled prices for grains,
taxation
and
the
need
for
cash,
inappropriate
new
agricultural
technology, disruption of customary
pastoralist patterns of transhumance,
and
arguably,
increased
commercialization of animal products.
By the 1950's there was clear reason for
concern about accelerating population
growth and environmental degradation
(Franke and Chasin;
Roberts;
Gervais;
OECD 1988).
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The mindset and intellectual baggage
inherited from the colonial era includes
a number of ingredients particularly
germane to the issue of present day
problems in NRM.
These include an
abiding
misunderstanding
of
the
complex Sahelian ecology, the economic
goal of transforming rural systems in
order to maximize exportable production,
and a combination · of ignorance and
disinterest concerning peasant farming
systems
including
the
indigenous
knowledge that produced them.
A central colonial concept of power sees
the state in charge of everything,
appropriating virtually all authority to
itself.
French policies had far reaching
impact
over
the
region;
yet,
administration over the vast interior of
the Sahel was too extenuated to exercise
detailed control over local level natural
resources
in
individual
sedentary
commumt1es or distant rangelands far
from military units.
Elements of the
pre-colonial
NRM
arrangements
continued to hold sway.
Nonetheless, the
colonial
authority
established
the
hegemonic right of central government
over rule making, rule enforcement and
revenues
from
these
resource
management functions.
Whatever
democratic
ideology
the
colonizing nation may have expounded
at
home,
the
model
of
colonial
government
is
authoritarian
and
centralized, based on military and police
enforcement.
A level of administrative
deconcentration was a financial and
logistic necessity of colonialism, but the
supremacy of central authority was
unquestioned.
After the second World
War, the British and later the French
experimented with limited devolution to
elected local self-government, under
strict colonial tutelage and in the context
of absolute military authority. The set of
institutional
changes
proposed
and
partially
implemented
in
certain
African colonies represented the first
modern
articulation of a decentralized
governance
structure.
African

nationalist
leaders
in
the
1950's
vigorously supported decentralization as
a means of building local political
support. That these same leaders moved
decisively to re-centralize power after
independence should not be surpnsmg
in light of overall centralized colonial
patterns of control, inadequate human
resources
and
limitations of their
legitimacy
(Ostrom,
Schroeder
and
Wynne;
Mawhood).
With the transfer of authority to postcolonial governments in the 1960s, many
statist institutions and colonial policies
gained
new
status.
Napoleonic
prefectoral
systems
of
limited
deconcentration
complemented
centralized constitutions which were
influenced by the Fifth Republic in
Without the military strength of
France.
European powers, the small experiments
in devolution to local self-government
introduced in the late stages of French
colonial rule seemed to the leaders of
newly independent states to invite
regional and ethnic dissension while
absorbing scarce resources.
As a result,
they
were dismantled shortly after
independence. In Senegal, for instance,
municipal elections were eliminated
shortly after independence and by 1963,
executive power was vested in the
President of the Republic (Mawhood;
Campbell et. al.).
Senegal more than other Sahelian postcolonial
nations
has
continued
to
experiment
with
decentralization,
especially
after
enactment
of the
Territorial and Local Administration
Reform
of
1972
which
aimed
at
devolving some authority to elected
Rural Councils.
In reality, however,
little effective transfer of authority to
lower levels of government has actually
taken place (Rondinelli and Minis; Ba).

Tempering this generalization is the
reality that many people move back and
forth between these sectors.
Another
profound division in society is that
which separates the general citizenry
from their autocratic rulers.
Yet
another division is that which pits rural
producers
against
Sahelian
governments.
An
observation
concerning. CILSS
member
GuineaBissau rings true for other Sahclian
societies, namely that the major conflict
is, "... not a split between rural and
urban sectors, but a struggle between
government and peasants over control
of resources." (Galli and Jones).
Notable influences on the environment
during the colonial and the early postcoloni al
period
were
pressured
expansion of agriculture northward into
areas of inadequate rainfall, a geometric
increase in the number of cattle and a
dramatic rise in the human population.
In Mali, for example, the land area under
rainfed agriculture increased by 80% in
the 1950s and 1960s.
The number of
cattle in the western Sahel jumped by an
estimated 500% in the 25 years leading
up to the drought of 1968-1974. Also, the
importance of a doubling of the human
population in just 25 years cannot be
BOSTID;
OECD
overemphasized (Cross;
1988).
In sum, many more people and animals
governed
by
less effective control
systems were straining to survive in an
ecologically fragile region that was
about
to
experience
a
deep
and
prolonged drought.
We shift attention to
the human side of this deteriorating
situation to review how the colonial and
post-colonial governments have tried to
deal with their rural populations.
Attempts to organize in rural areas

The Sahel is increasingly split into a
modern,
urban-based
sector and
a
traditional
rural
one,
with
great
disparities in their economies, access to
social services, educational opportunities
and sense of loyalty or identification.

15

Since NGOs as we know them today
appeared on the scene quite recently, we
might , first review the somewhat longer
history of forced and voluntary rural

groupings.
One of the most socially
disruptive policies was the forced
restructuring of authority.
Pre-existing
governance structures were stripped of
authority
and
replaced
with
a
standardized hierarchy of appointed
leaders directly under colonial control.
From the standpoint of natural resource
governance,
this
imposed
system
disrupted
the
customary
framework
required for settlement of disputes
among
resource
users
and
for
enforcement of orderly resource use.
Attempts to organize rural populations
began quite early in the colonial era. By
1910 the French had obliged farmers in
Senegal's peanut basin to form Societes
Indigcnes de Prevoyance, SIP, or native
provident societies, in order to manage
seed stocks.
The SIP system of
compulsory cooperat.ives was eventually
imposed across the Sahelian colonies in
the 1930s and 1940s, supposedly as an
agricultural credit and food security
system. In reality, SIP was a useful
mechanism
for
tax
gathering
and
political control.
By the Second World
War, groundnut growers in the cash
crop areas of Senegal were organizing to
defend
their
interests
against
the
groundnut traders.
This movement was
eventually formalized and subsequently
diffused,
rendering
it
powerless
(Snrech; Roberts; A.G. Hopkins).
Between 1945 and 1957 additional control
structures of obigatory organization
were added, such as organizmg rural
producers into cooperatives and creating
urban consumer cooperatives to assure
supplies for the colonial administrators.
Food stocking continued under the guise
of food security, while actually serving
as a means of extracting grain from each
peasant household to finance all those
on the colonial payroll, including the
imposed chiefs.
Not surprisingly, there
was widespread refusal to subscribe to
these
organizations
of
subjugation
(SPONG).
One
spontaneous
form
of popular
association begun in the, colonial era was
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solidarity or mutual assistance groups
among migrant workers from the same
village of zone.
A kind of self-help
mechanism in the face of colonialism,
such groups were often linked to Islam,
though kinship
and common home
location were the major bonds.
These
urban
solidarity
groups
facilitated
remittances
and
exchange
of
information, and started a trend of
committee formation in certain home
villages.
In more recent times, as
African
migration
to
Europe
has
expanded, especially from the Senegal
River valley regions of Senegal and
Mali, such migrant groups have become
major
contributors
to
development
activities in their home regions (Ba).
Independence produced various attempts
at government-managed organization of
rural
producers,
mainly
through
cooperative organizations in rural areas.
None of these were effective in the long
run.
A Senegalese government attempt
in 1961 to organize broad-based popular
participation
through
a
national
network
of
peanut
purchasing
cooperatives was successfully resisted by
commercial interests.
By 1963 the roles
of the Senegalese cooperatives and selfhelp
rural
community
organizations
were limited
to
technical
matters.
Repeated
attempts
to
revive
gov em men t-s p on so red
cooperatives
were made, including a major reform in
1983 creating a grand total of nearly
4500 cooperative sections in a national
structure.
However, a recent field study
reported that most local sections are
inactive and exist only on paper
(Gagnon;
Republique du Sencgal1989b).
In
Mali,
a
kind
of
obligatory
collectivization took place when the
post-colonial
socialist-oriented
government instituted a new trading
system based on village cooperatives and
associations of these cooperatives and
attempted to abolish the old mercantile
structures. Only parts of this new system
were in place when the 1968 military
coup ended the socialist experiment.
In
Niger,
the
National
Credit
and

Cooperative Union, UNCC, had some
successes
organizing
peasants
and
producer peanut markets in the 1960s,
but the political power of competing
commercial
interests
eventually
marginalized their operations (N. S.
Hopkins).
The regulatory structure and rhetoric of
cooperatives
were
often
maintained
after these early failures in formalized
participation.
A small number of these
government-inspired cooperatives have
been successful, and there are a few
examples
of
functioning
nongovernmental cooperatives.
To varying
degrees,
Sahelian
governments
abandoned even this veneer of a
participatory
aspect
in
rural
development in favor of a large scale,
top-down model of extension work and
modernization.
Because cooperatives are
now generally perceived as failed,
centrally
controlled
structures,
the
newer
independent
organizations
in
most rural areas no longer use this term.
Groupement
and association are the
prefered
titles
for
most
rural
organizations.
Just as the concept of cooperatives was
discredited through official use in the
colonial and early post-colonial period,
governments have also captured and
corrupted the use of such concepts as
popular participation, mobilization and
democracy, using them to describe
undemocratic and unpopular policies,
practices and institutions.
Employed as
catch phrases in governmental rhetoric
on national development, these concepts
have become tools of social manipulation
(Langley).
The
International
Conference
on
Popular Participation held in Arusha,
Tanzania, in February 1990 took back
this vocabulary.
The Charter of that
conference
proclaimed
that popular
participation should be measured by
freedom of association, existence of
democratic institutions, rule of law,
political
accountability,
and
decentralization
of
decision-making
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processes, among other criteria.
Still,
like the corruption of "cooperative", the
devaluation of "participation" as a
concept is' a loss in itself (ECA).
Cooperatives
were
not
the
only
government
instigated
rural
organizations.
One organizing effort in
Senegal initiated in 1954 and expanded
by the post-colonial government in the
1960s centered around the proliferation
of Centres d'Expansion Rural Polyvalent,
(CERP).
To support these agricultural
modernization centers, villagers were
encouraged
to
organize
Rural
Development Committees, and many
communities did so.
These rural
mobilization
committees
were
subsequently
challenged
for
their
position in rural commumt1es in the
1970s by the youth movement of the
dominant national political party, Union
Progressiste Senegalaise.
The youth
groups in turn were de-politicized over
time
and
finally
re-emerged
as
development-oriented associations (Ba).
One
other
government-based
rural
outreach scheme that began in Senegal
and Niger in the 1960s and which is still
in existence is animation rurale, or rural
animation.
Animation services were
meant to raise awareness and motivate
communities to carry out self-help
projects.
Animation services have run
into many difficulties: getting technical
services to cooperate, the perception of
imposed act1v1lles and a lack of real
institution building to ensure continued
execution.
Their effectiveness in many
areas has been limited (Kane).
One observation to be drawn from this
brief review of early attempts at
government
imposed
or
induced
organization in the rural Sahel is that
standardized approaches cannot take
into account the complexity of local
situations
and
needs.
Another
observation is that at a local level,
national governments lose their ability
to command involvement.
People simply
avoid or mrn1mize participation in
organizations or activities if they do not

perceive it to be in their interest.
With
those thoughts, we turn to the next actor
to arrive in the Sahel, northern NGOs.
The arrival of foreign NGOs
NGOs might be said to have made their
debut during the colonial era in the
form of Christian church sponsored
activities.
The churches' impact during
this period was less intensive in much of
the internal Sahel than in coastal areas
of West Africa, but Catholic and
Protestant churches were an important
non-governmental
element
of
the
French colonial policy of assimilation,
particularly in Senegal, Burkina Faso
and southern Chad.
Church programs in
health and education tended to reinforce
a non-parllc1patory, authoritarian model
of leadership, and GOntributed to cultural
dependency as immortalized in the
image of African children memorizing,
"nos ancetres les gaulois ...
II

On the other hand, small groups of
church-related
agencies
in
Francophone West Africa,
such as
INADES,
Institut Africain pour le
Dcveloppement Economique et Social,
began
by
the
1960's
to
provide
leadership
trammg
in
rural
areas.
These first tentative steps towards
supporting
autonomous
rural
organizations and these organizations'
determined continuation of leadership
training has resulted in many energetic
rural leaders who are active in ROs today
(Snrech).
The first big wave of international NGOs
in the Sahel came as relief agencies in
the latter stages of the 1968-1974
drought.
NGOs were such a new
phenomenon in some countries that
protocols and procedures did not yet exist
and had to be hastily established.
When
the first US NGOs were set up in Niger
the government placed them under the
tutelage of the Minister of Defense,
apparently because much of the national
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relief operation
military uni ts.

was

carried

out

by

Many of these international NGOs stayed
in the Sahel to work with refugee and
displaced populations, and to assist with
the rehabilitation of the destitute after
the drought emergency subsided. By
mid-1970's, NGOs were an established
part of the Sahel development scene,
often engaging former volunteers from
Peace Corps and other agencies as field
staff.
Their typical level of intervention
was individual rural communities.
Their
activities tended to address the immediate
needs of these commun1t1es, such as
supplying agricultural tools and seeds,
replenishing herds, deepening village
wells and training in primary health
care.
Some NGOs' experimental act1v1t1es in
NRM during this period, particularly in
the areas windbreaks and reforestation,
soil
and
water
conservation,
well
digging and small scale irrigation,
helped establish NGOs' reputation as
innovators.
This will be explored
further in the section on NRM below.
A second wave of external NGOs arrived
in the Sahel with the severe drought
years beginning in 1983.
Many long
term
development
activities
were
temporarily
abandoned
for
the
immediate tasks of mobilizing massive
famine relief efforts.
In some Sahelian
countries,
such
as
Niger,
the
government was much better prepared
than in the 1968-1974 drought, and
coordinated the NGOs' participation.
By
contrast, Malian NGOs themselves played
major
role
in
organizing
and
a
delivering food, supplies and services to
the northern regions of the country.
International NGOs active in Mali
illustrate
the
range
of
these
organizations.
They include well known
larger NGOs with multi-faceted programs
and multi-million dollar budgets, such as
Care, Save the Children Federation,
Foster Parents Plan,
Africare, OXFAM,
ACORD, Medecins Sans Frontiere, World

Vision,
Association
Franr;aise
des
Volontaires du Progres, and Centre
Canadien d'Etudes et de Cooperation
Internationale, Norwegian Church Aid
and Helvitas of Switzerland. On the other
extreme of size and scope are small or
single purpose foreign NGOs operating
in Mali.
Examples include one NGO
formed by a retired French couple who
. raise funds in the Languedoc region for
community development projects in the
area in Mali where they now live, an
Italian NGO whose only project in Mali
involves solar-powered water pumps,
and an international NGO based in
Amsterdam that focuses on south-south
cooperation for food security (CCA-ONG
1989).
The creation of national NGOs
The late 1970's and 1980's was a period of
rapid growth of national NGOs in the
Sahel.
A very small number had been
established
earlier
as
charitable
religious operations, such as Secours
Catholique
Malien
and
Eglise
Evangelique de la Republique du Niger,
founded in 1959 and 1960, respectively.
By and large the national NGO movement
in the Sahel is only a little more than a
decade old, with some differences among
the countries.
On one recent inventory
of 88 Malian NGOs, of the 69 whose
founding dates are noted, 64 were
launched since 1980.
Burkina Faso
shows an earlier start. Of 45 NGOs' whose
founding dates are indicated on a similar
inventory of 54 Burkinkabe NGOs, eight
existed before 1970, 22 started during the
decade of the 1970s, and fifteen were
launched in the 1980s.
In Niger, except
for two church-related agencies and the
Croix Rouge Nigcrienne, all the other
national NGOs are less than ten years old.
Senegal may have the oldest NGO group.
According to data collected in 1988, five
Senegalese NGOs have over 30 years of
experience. However, 60% of national
NGOs were listed as being created in the
last ten years (SCS 1991; Booth and Ly).
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The impetus to form NGOs comes from
many sources.
In the 1970's it came in
part from
seeing
the example of
international
NGOs
that
established
themselves during and after the drought
when funding was relatively plentiful.
This process was repeated in the mid1980s, especially in Mali, but also in
Burkina Faso and Senegal.
Some
international NGOs established national
affiliates,
which
have
subsequently
gained various degrees of autonomy.
International NGOs . that function as
funders rather than implementers, such
as
OXFAM,
actively
support
the
emergence of national NGOs.
An increasing number of foreign-based
NGOs depend on national staff in the
Certain northern NGOs have no
Sahel.
expatriate personnel in county.
By
employing
and
training
national
personnel, these foreign
NGOs arc
blurring the north-south distinction, at
For
least among the NGOs themselves.
example, at a recent international NGO
conference, the Sahclian NGO leaders
selected
as
their
spokesperson
a
Senegalese woman who is on the staff of
an American NGO.
In this case, the
person was more important than her
organizational affiliation.
A possible
down side to the employment of more
national personnel by ·northern NGOs is
the draining off or hiring away of some
of the most skilled and experienced
people who are also needed by Sahelian
NGOs and other national organizations.
A major cause for the expansion of new
NGOs is found in the failures of
government-led development efforts.
In
some cases, retired civil servants· who
are frustrated and disenchanted with
government bcauracracy launch NGOs
with the aim of working on development
issue that preoccupy them.
Some NGO
leaders come from the ranks of Sahclian
students who have studied abroad and
return home determined to take a more
direct
hand
rn
their
countries'
development than government service
would allow them.

The example of Mali gives an impression
of the growth and diversity of the Sahel
NGO community. This impression can be
obtained
from
reviewing
the
development of the NGO consortium,
Comite de Coordination des Actions des
Organisations Non-gouvernementales au
Mali, (CCA-ONG). Launched in early 1984
as an ad hoc group of 22 NGOs concerned
about the drought, the group counted 37
founding
members
at
it
form al
constitutional founding two years later.
Its 1986-1987 directory lists 45 members
of which ten were national NGOs.
By
September 1989, CCA-ONG membership
had grown to 83, plus another 37 nonmember partner NGOs for a total of 120.
55, or 41 %, of these 120 NGO members and
partners
are
Malian
national
organizations.
Perhaps one-half of all
legally recognized Malian NGOs have
joined the consortium and many newly
formed NGOs are waiting government
recogn1t1on. CCA-ONG's statistics are
indicative of the rapid growth under
way. Later, we will take a closer look at
CCA-ONG's activities in the section on
NGO solidarity (CCA-ONG 1987; CCA-ONG
1989).
The titles of many Malian NGOs indicates
their sector or zone of intervention:
Groupe de Recherche et d'Application
Technique
(appropriate
technology),
Association pour la Formation et la
Reinsertion
des
Africains
Migrants
(training and re-integration of migrant
workers
returning
from
Europe),
Association Pour la Sauvegarde de
Tombouctou
(preservation
and
restoration of Timbuktu), and Comite de
Salut Public de Diafarabe (public safety
of Diafarabe village).
Several Africa
regional NGOs are also active in Mali, for
example, the Dakar-based NGO Appui a la
Formation
et aux
Technologies en
Afrique de l'Ouest, AFOTEC, and l'Agence
Islamique pour le Secours en Afrique
based in Khartoum.
In terms of NGOs'
involvement
in
natural
resource
management, a recent survey counted at
least 56 national and international NGOs
in Mali working in sectors directly
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involving NRM.
Another survey found
that almost 80% of 150 NGOs in Burkina
Faso are promoting NRM activities (CCAONG 1989; Booth; Painter).
Foreign aid is sometimes refered to as the
only growth industry in the Sahel.
This
has led some observers to suggest that
the proliferation of NGOs is little more
than an opportunistic effort to capture a
part
of
that
market.
The
characterization
is
that of cynical
government functionaries who set up
NGOs on the side to moonlight for grants
from donors intent on funding NGOs.
There is a joke among NGOs about the
new group, Association des Faux Paysans,
faux
meaning
imitation
or
bogus.
Undoubtedly some people are trying to
take personal advantage of the current
interest in NGOs. The vast majority of
NGO or ROs leaders, however, are
dedicated, hard working and scrupulous
and they understand the value of their
collective reputation.
NGO communities
have ways of policing themselves, and
questionable
agencies
are
usually
identified as such.
Other criticisms of NGOs can be made.
Some of these have to do with the youth
and inexperience of these agencies and
their leaders, The range of skills
required to manage a small development
organization is daunting and there is no
school for NGO directors.
One must
somehow become proficient in program
planning,
institutional
development,
proposal
wntrng and fund
raising,
development theory and methodologies,
financial accounting, public relations,
personnel
management,
and
the
technical specialties of the agency.
All
of these areas represent weak points for
NGOs.
NGOs, both foreign and national, are also
very susceptible to manipulation by
donors who have their own agendas.
Especially young NGOs that lack funds
and experience often feel obliged to fit
into activities selected by donors as a
Once the pattern
way of getting started.
is established it is hard to break out into

more
independent
design
implementation modalities (Ba).

and

As an exercise in a training program on
strategic planning, a group of Sahelian
NGO leaders were put in the hypothetical
situation of managing a new
and
financially weak NGO that has defined its
mandate
as
improving
agricultural
productivity. This NGO had not been able
to attract any donors to its basic
program, but did finally receive an offer
of funding from a foreign donor to
manage a family
planning project.
Faced with the decision either to refuse
this offer and continue looking for
resources to work in agriculture, or to
accept funding in a completely different
sector, the Sahelian NGO participants
almost unanimously elected to do family
planning on the logic that this would at
least get the NGO functioning.
Practicality, principles and opportunism
interact in more subtle ways than this
training exercise portrays.
The result of
fund raising imperatives for NGOs is
often to pull the focus of planning and
decision making away from the rural
populations whose lives and livelihoods
are at stake.
One other area of weakness for NGOs of
all national origins is in their level of
analysis.
Too often the pressure to get
on with tasks at hand interferes with the
necessary data collection, analysis and
documentation.
For activities involving
natural
resource management, where
detailed, site-specific data and analysis
are essential, this oversight reduces the
quality of NGO programming.
It also
reduces the quality of NGO discourse
concerning the complex topics about
which
the
NGO
community
has
considerable knowledge
(Painter).
To return to the larger context, the
emergence of national NGOs has created
a whole new segment in Sahelian
societies in less than two decades.
Enormous attention is now focused on
these young organizations, attention
that is often superficial and self-serving
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by
governments,
donors
and
other
development agencies.
There is a great
risk that expectations of national NGOs
have been exaggerated way out of
proportion to what they can accomplish.
When they fail to deliver results rapidly
in areas where others with far greater
resources have failed for decades, NGOs
may find themselves out of fashion like
such former development trends as nonformal
education,
integrated
rural
development or basic needs strategics.
It is not that NGOs have sought star
status.
Rather, the current focus on
NGOs is more a reflection on the
development industry's continual need
for new strategies.
With that thought we
return to the institutional actors that
were introduced above, and take a closer
look at how they relate to each other.

4.
Relationships
Institutional
Actors

among

the

We
have
briefly
introduced
four
institutional actors.
We have discussed
certain aspects of colonial and postcolonial policies and the inception of
NGO communities in the West African
Sahel.
Now attention turns to the ways
in which the various actors relate to
each other.

Governments

- donors

The Sahel is one of the world's major aid
recipients.
Based on data of the mid1980s, 25% of the gross national product
in the CILSS countries is derived from
foreign aid receipts, compared to under
6% for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.
Dealing with donors has become a major
function of some governments.
A total
of over 700 official donor missions
visited to Burkina Faso in a single year.
This level of contribution and presence
affords donors considerable influence
with the governments they subsidize
(Cross).

International donors have become a
mainstay of Sahclian public sector
expansion through financial support to
large public-sector projects, to parastatal
operations, and increasingly to the
governments' operating budgets.
The
increase
in
centralized
government
budgets in the Sahel has dramatically
outstripped the very limited expansion
of their national economics.
This has
been made possible, in part, by nonproj ect
aid
contributions
from
international donors to governments.
This aid now accounts for over 50% of all
official development assistance.
The
other
factor .that
has
made
this
disproportionate growth of the public
sector possible is the revenue generated
by the high level of taxation of farmers'
incomes;
this, in turn, has increased
pressure on rural resources (OECD 1988).

now focusing on trammg and credit for
private producer groups, and it is
working through an American NGO to
provide these services (AID).

Donor
agencies
have
played
a
significant role in the development and
maintenance of the highly centralized
national
structures that characterize
Sahelian governments today.
When
working
directly
with
government's
technical
services did not produce
desired results, major donors attempted
to
decentralize
their
efforts
by
constructing parallel institutions.
In
Mali, donors split up the country, each
funding
huge
regional
parastatal
agencies, such as Operation Riz Scgou, a
rice-promotion parastatal or Operation
Haute Vallee in the upper valley of the
Niger River.
In time these have also
became bogged down
and
inflated
bureaucracies themselves.

NGOs - donors

In some areas donors have identified
past errors and tried to correct them,
taking Sahelian governments in new
policy directions.
Having fueled the
massive
build-up
of
government
bureaucracies
and
having
financed
gov em men t-c on tro l lcd
dcve lopmen t
programs over the years, donors are now
attempting to redirect stale involvement
towards support of private and local
m1tiat1vcs.
In Mali, for example, after
$20 million of support to a parastatal
agricultural productivity project, AID is
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Donors' use of direct financial 'carrots'
to lead governments toward economic
policy reforms has had side effects on
funding for activities relating to natural
resource management. Increasing direct
subsidies to Saheliari governments has
meant decreasing donor investments in
other areas.
Current aid investments in
rainfed agriculture, an area that is key
to meeting food requirements, constitute
only 4% of total official aid.
The
proportion of aid going to reforestation
and environmental efforts is an abysmal
1.5% of the total, and this share is
dropping (OECD 1988).

The NGO movement began as a charitable
impulse, responding to disasters and
providing social welfare services.
NGOs
from
Europe
and
North
America
historically raised most of their funds
from
non-governmental
sources,
soliciting their monies from private
foundations and the general public.
When their major function involved
disaster
relief,
public
appeals
concerning
famine
and
other
catastrophics periodically netted NGOs
large amounts of discretionary funding.
The
general
public,
however,
has
proven far less interested in funding the
slow, unspectacular and less guiltabsolving work of development.
With the change of focus from relief to
long-term development, bilateral donors
now provide the lion's share of funding
for external NGOs working in the Sahel.
Some American agencies have difficulty
even meeting the minimum 20% private
funding rule imposed by Congress to
maintain PYO status for grant eligibility.
Some Canadian NGOs are similarly
strained
to
meet
the
one-to-five
contribution
required
for
matching

I
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funds from CIDA.
Given the dominance
of bilateral donors in NGO financing, the
struggle for control of the development
agenda for the supposedly independent
non-governmental
sector
is
an
immediate
and
growing
concern
(Hellinger, Hellinger and O'Regan).
Bearing in mind that the term donor in
this
paper
refers
primarily
to
governmental
and
inter-governmental
agencies, it follows that the donors'
major funding relationship has been
with the governments of the Sahelian
countries. This also means that in most
cases these governments must approve
or at least acquiesce when donors choose
to
channel
resources through nongovernmental
agencies.
While some
bilateral agencies are less restricted in
this
regard,
the
funds
of
intergovernmental agencies such as UNDP
and the World Bank are treated as
allocations to the recipient government.
One result of this situation can be
excessive government involvement in
the allocation and management of funds
intended for the NGO community. For
example, when the World Bank wanted to
set up a pilot project to fund NGOs in
Togo, the government insisted that
management responsibilities be within a
ministry.
The resulting bureacracy has
left the Togolese government in tight
control of the funds, a situation resented
The
by the independent-minded NGOs.
project has been virtually blocked by
the government's apparent disinterest
in NGO capacity building.
Likewise,
when UNDP decided to set up a fund for
grassroots
projects
in
Mali,
the
government insisted on controlling the
money.
Subsequent UN attempts to
overcome mismanagement of this fund
by establishing a separate unit were
derailed by Malian officials.
Bilateral donor agencies have been
somewhat less restricted in finding ways
to fund NGOs. However, a major problem
with
these
donors
has
been
the
administrative burden of making and
managing quantities of relatively small
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grants of the size that NGOs can absorb.
One solution to this has been the
development by donor agencies of
"umbrella" projects that make a kind of
block grant for NGOs, and sometimes
award the management of this block
grant to an intermediary agency.
This
intermediary or lead agency in turn
makes
a
series
of sub-grants
to
individual NGOs, and may also provide
trarnrng,
technical
assistance
and
coordination services to the sub-grantee
agencies.
As this is an increasingly
common funding mechanism, we will
take a brief look at several experiences
of umbrella projects in the Sahel.
Umbrella

Projects

Three AID-funded umbrella projects in
the Sahel illustrate some of the problems
and
limitations
of
this
funding
mechanism.
Two of the umbrella
projects, the Partners in Development
Project in Chad and the PYO CoFinancing Project in Mali, share the
distinct features of funding only US PYOs
to the exclusion of national agencies.
Neither of these two projects employ
external
intermediary
agencies
and
neither provided ancillary training or a
high level of coordin<;ition among PYOs
or NGOs.
The projects were conceived
basically as straight funding devices.
In the design phase of the Mali umbrella
project, the AID mission in Bamako
decided to exclude national NGOs from
direct funding.
Setting aside the
findings of a comprehensive survey of
NGOs that it had commissioned, the AID
Bamako mission concluded that Malian
NGOs do not have the capacity to
administer AID grants.
While the Mali
umbrella project strongly encourages US
PYO grantees to work with national
organizations, Malian NGO leaders resent
their exclusion from direct funding
participation. The Mali project has yet to
be formally evaluated.
However, a US
government audit of the Chad project
criticized AID's
failure
to provide

coordination among grantees, resulting
in decreased effectiveness.
By retaining
management of these
two
projects
within the respective AID missions,
rather
than
using
intermediary
agencies,
many
of
the
potential
advantages of umbrella projects were
forfeited (Otto and Drabek).
In Senegal, the Community Enterprise
and Development Project was managed
by an intermediary, a US non-profit
firm.
The project, based in Kaolack,
called for national NGOs to provide loans
to ROs for income generating activities.
Several NGOs declined to participate, in
part because they wanted to work with
communities on more broadly defined
activities that were not necessarily
credit worthy, or they did not want to
have
the
kind
of
loan
agency
relationship to ROs- required by the
project.
What is more, few NGOs were
previously active in the Kaolack zone
and few national NGOs had experience
administering credit programs.
In the
end, a minimal number of national and
foreign NGOs received subgrants, but
most of these NGOs required extensive
technical training and assistance.
The
project experienced delays as NGOs had to
set up operations and build relationships
in a new area.
Although the various
participating NGOs grappled with similar
technical
difficulties
in
their subprojects, they had very little contact
with each other through the project.
By
the end of AID funding in 1990 relatively
few of the ROs involved in the project
were ready to negotiate loans from
regular credit institutions as had been
the aim of the project. In planning for a
new follow-on NGO support project, AID
has worked hard to involve national
NGOs in the design phase in order to
overcome some of the problems of the
Kaolack project (Otto and Drabek).
One of the lessons to be drawn from
these three projects is the importance of
soliciting
input
from
NGOs
and
beneficiaries for the design of projects
that they are meant to implement.
Other
lessons
include
the
importance of
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facilitating
information
exchange
among NGOs and of providing support
services to up-grade NGOs' capac1t1es.
Another lesson or observation is that
decentralization of authority does not
always have a salutary effect. While AID
Washington policy on NGOs in Africa
encourages participation by national
NGOs as well as US PVOs in AID-funded
projects, a determined field mission with
decision-making authority can override
such policy guidance.
One further example of an NGO umbrella
project is Solidarite-Canada-Sahel, SCS,
which
provides
funding
and
coordination for Canadian and Sahelian
NGOs in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
Under the SCS project 30 Canadian NGOs
involved in either development work in
the Sahel or in development education
efforts in Canada formed a consortium
with national NGOs in the three Sahelian
country.
The main principles of this
innovative
approach
include
an
integration of development and public
education
components,
new
partnerships
among
Canadian
and
Sahelian NGOs, and a particular attention
to women's contribution in development
activities.
In addition to innovative education
programs in Canada, mainly in Quebec,
SCS provides individual Sahelian NGOs
with both institutional support and
project
funding
possibilities.
Partnership relations between Sahelian
and Canadian NGOs are encouraged for
implementation of larger projects in the
field.
Sahelian nationals hired by SCS
coordinate in-country act1v1t1es, while
Sahelian NGO leaders are periodically
invited to Canada for project planning
sessions and to participate in public
information campaigns organized by SCS
consortium members.
CIDA, the major
funder
of SCS,
has
allowed
the
consortium and its Sahelian partners
considerable leeway
in design
and
execution their program.
One other regional program that is an
umbrella of sorts is the PYO-NGO Natural
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Resources Support Project, PYO-NGO
NRMS,
which
is
managed
by
a
consortium of three US PYOs. During the
design phase of PYO-NGO NRMs, US and
African NGOs were asked what they
thought was useful in a regional support
project.
Their reply was a fieldcontrolled,
needs
driven,
flexible
mechanism
that
encourages
collaborative action (Otto 1988).
J

Operating in four pilot countries, this
AID-funded
project
has
devolved
decision
making
to
in-country
groupings of NGOs that decide on small
grants, training programs and other
support activities. In Mali, the only
Sahelian country in the pilot program,
PYO-NGO NRMs works directly with the
NGO consortium CCA-ONG. A task force of
NGOs in Mali designed an innovative
program with the help of project staff.
Some 15 small grants have been made to
NGOs for such practical, innovative
activities as farmer exchange visits and
the testing of new living fencing
methods.
The project also has funds for
special activities, such as a trammg
workshop held in Mali for NGO leaders
from
several
countries
entitled,
"Building the Capacity of NGOs to
Implement NRM Activities in the Sahel"
and a pastoral sector assessment in Mali.
PYO-NGO NRMs has been touted as
a
model for AID Africa regional support to
NGOs (NRMs; Brown and Dakono).
These few examples suggest some of the
themes in the donor-NGO relationship, in
particular the control that bilateral
donors
often
exert
over
their
relationships
with
NGOs
and
the
difficulties
donors
have
in
understanding how to work with NGOs.
They also indicate what can happen
when NGOs themselves are able to
part1c1pate m setting the terms of
engagement with donors.
UNDP, World Bank and almost all major
donors now have. offices to deal with
NGOs and are trying to figure out how to
work with them.
Differences between
donors and NGOs include their planning
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horizons,
operating
styles,
macroeconomic orientation, and institutional
cultures. One of the most difficult donorNGO differences to bridge is that of scale.
Donor demands for rapid and widespread impact clash with the NGO
perspective that the spread of benefits
can only come from replicating humanscalc act1v1t1es, not by preconceived,
standardized, large-scale enterprises.
In
NRM in particular, the focus is on local
involvement
in
researching
and
applying approaches that fit with local
strategies, capacities and needs.
Once an
effective NRM intervention is developed,
its diffusion will come if the right
conditions exist.
Government policies
and practices are often a constraint to
such diffusion, especially if the original
success occurred within a project under
an exceptional policy environment, i.e.,
one-time
waivers
or
site-specific
permissions (Otto 1987; Paincr).
Donor-NGO collaboration is, in the words
of one Sahclian NGO leader, like
attempting a marriage between a camel
and a mouse.
Ironically, donors often
express frustration at not being able to
program all of their funds earmarked
for NGOs, while NGOs, especially the
newer national ones, arc unable to
secure
basic
financial
assistance.
Donors and NG Os can and do work we! I
together.
Many innovative NGO efforts
in NRM are funded in part by bilateral
donors. A key element to success in NRM
projects is an
acknowledgement that
they are often experimental, meaning
they might not yield the projected
results.
The potential of failure, even
the right of failure, should be faced
more candidly so that risk-taking and
experimentation
are
encouraged.
Donor-NGO collaboration seems to work
best when activities evolve from NGOcommunity
interactions
rather
than
originating as donor-designed projects,
donors
coordinated
although
contribution to the overall direction can
be useful.

Rural organizations - donors
Donor relations with rural organizations
have been limited for some of the same
reasons that limit donor-NGO relations.
ROs are even less likely than NGOs to
meet donors' criteria for fiscal and
administrative capacity.
Unlike NGOs,
ROs do not usually have the kind of
capital city presence that reaches the
level of most donors.
In the early years of the post-colonial
era, donors and certain international
NGOs contributed significant sums to
various
schemes
to
organize
rural
populations
under
the
national
governments' control. Some of these
centralized efforts still continue, or have
taken
new
forms
under
different
development programs.
However, the
small size of individual independent ROs
now emerging seem·s far beneath the
scale of most donor programs.
The ambivalent or hostile attitudes of
many S ahelian governments towards
self-defined ROs make it more difficult
for donors to work with ROs even if they
wish to do so.
Encouraging Sahelian
governments to loosen restrictions on
the
formation
and
functioning
of
autonomous ROs is one vital contribution
donors can make. This is also in keeping
with the current donor emphasis on
private
rn1t1atives
and
pluralistic
societies.
In some countries, donors are
already
doing this.
More direct
approaches, such as the suggestion to
make
the
right
to
organize
a
conditionality of funding have not been
accepted.
The non-project direct subsidy style of
foreign aid has removed donors even
further from involvement with rural
populations.
Institutional
strengthening
in
the
rural
nongovernmental
sector
has
actually
lessened as a donor priority under the
conservative aid policies begun in the
1980s that target macro-policy reform
(Derman).
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Recently,
however,
donors
have
recognized the significance of such
independent ROs, and are actively
looking for ways to support them. Proof
of this interest is demonstrated by the
carefully orchestrated inclusion of RO
representatives in a major regional
conference sponsored by CILSS and Club
du Sahel on local management of natural
resources.
This encounter was the May
1989 Rencontre Regionale in Segou,
Mali, on the theme of "la gestion de
terroire villageois," which translates
roughly as the management of village
lands and resources.
The CILSS/Club du
Sahel process has been criticized for
using
these
RO
representatives
to
further a policy agenda at Segou, but
then not continuing to include them in
the
on-going
debate
on
managing
national resources.
NGOs were absent from the Segou
encounter, an omission that has hardly
facilitated an integration of reflection
and action among these institutional
actors.
There seems to be some recent
indication that northern NGOs at least
will find a place at the CILSS/Club du
Sahel "'pres Segou" discussions, but the
debate remains essentially a donorgovernment dialogue with occasional
input from ROs and NGOs.
In terms of direct financial support to
ROs,
most
bilateral
and
intergovernmental donors are obliged to use
intermediaries such as NGOs, which have
the
self-defined
mandate
and
methodologies
for
working
with
individual groups of rural resource
use.rs. There are increasing exceptions
among donors that are able to act
creatively to get out from under their
own institutional limitations.
The
European
Community's
FED
is
experimenting with direct funding to
local organizations, and the official
Swiss aid agency, Direction de la
Cooperation au Developpement et de
!'Aide Humanitaire, ODA, has had a
program since 1983 working with over

80 community groups in Niafunke, Mali
(Hochet).
Goyemments - NGOs
During
the
first
decade
after
independence,
governments
did
not
have to contend with NGOs to any great
extent. In the decade of the 1970's, this
changed with the arrival of external
NGOs and the first stirrings of national
NGOs. The 1980's have forced many
Sahelian governments to deal with the
growing presence of external NGOs
along with rapidly expanding national
NGO movements. In addition to the
alternative power center that these new
organizations
represent,
governments
must face the fact that NGOs are
increasingly favored by foreign donor
agencies in development efforts.
NGOs
are
perceived
by
governments
as
competing directly for donor funding.
Considering the monopolistic mentality
towards political power in civil society
that Sahelian governments inherited
from the colonial era, the ambivalent to
wary approach of governments to an
expanding non-governmental sector is
understandable.
Sahelian governments
may resent NGOs' very existence.
They
may feel threatened by NGOs' grassroots
successes and popularity, particularily
when
contrasted
with
the
broad
perceptions
of
the
failures
of
government, statist efforts (Ward).
Provisions of Sahelian governments for
recognition and registration of national
NG Os vary considerably, from rather
routine registration practices in Mali,
Burkina Faso and Senegal to more
complex in Niger and impossible in
Guinea-Bissau.
In the lone Anglophone
member of CILSS, the Gambia, there are
at least three possible routes to legal
status for NGOs, the Friendly Societies Act
of 1919, the Companies Act of 1955, and
by direct government Decree.

27

In the case of Niger, there was no legal
statute pertaining to the registration of
development NGOs until 1990.
The
handful of Nigerien NGOs that have been
founded in recent years have been
obliged to seek legal status under a 1984
ordonnance
concerning
associations.
While this ordonnance permits youth,
school, religious, foreign and several
other types of associations, its exclusion
of development NGOs has been identified
by the NGO consortium in Niger, GAP, as
a major constraint on the emergence of
national NGOs
(Republique du Niger
1984; GAP).
A recent Niger government study on
promotion of national NGOs agreed with
this assessment and joined GAP's call for
revision of the associations ordinance.
The study candidly ascribed this legal
void to a desire to control all popular
initiatives and only authorize those that
conform to prescribed policies. A recent
amendment to the 1984 associations
ordinance now covers NGOs, but this is
far from the independent legal status
desired by the NGO community. The NGOs
feel that governmental preoccupation
with adjustments in the legislative text
must
also
be
match
with
public
announcements and discussion or build
confidence
in
goyernment
policy
changes toward NGOs (Rcpublique du
Niger 1990; Sidibe, Dakouo and Brown).
National NGOs arc subjected to more
governmental scrutiny
than external
NGOs, in part because NGOs might serve
political ambitions. National NGOs do not
enjoy the protection of a foreign
diplomatic mission.
National NGOs have
been suspected of political motives in
their work
helping
organize
rural
populations and providing services in
certain commun1t1cs.
This concern 1s
particularly vivid in Senegal, the one
truly multi-party political system in
West Africa;
but it also applies in the
Gambia
when
local
elections
arc
contested.
Even under military regimes
in other countries, NGOs that appear to
encourage local communities to question
authority or to create organizations

autonomous of government
have
been
suspected
of
political motives.

structures
harboring

Development activities in a poor country
cannot help but be a political matter. In
certain countries with evolving political
situations the risks for NGOs and ROs may
actually increase.
Decisions on where to
work and which communities will get
resources may become more sensitive.
Multi-party politics will bring rivalries
out into the open.
In their competition
for loyalty of rural voters, parties will
want to take credit for NGOs' services,
just as undemocratic governments have
done for years.
NGOs and ROs may be
tempted to side with parties that take
positions favorable to them.
Community
organizations
formed
for
local
development efforts can become a base
for lobbying or fqr overtly political
activities.
NGO leaders and RO leaders
certainly have the right to become
politically active as
individuals, and
their voices need to be heard;
however,
this could have an effect on how their
organizations are perceived.
While external NGOs have been accused
of political interference in other parts
of Africa, this has not been an issue
recently between governments and NGOs
in the Sahel.
External NGOs, however,
are often cited by governments for
ignoring official channels, refusing to
participate
in
regional
or
local
planning, or carrying out what one
Sahelian
leader
termed
'le
dcveloppement sauv age', uncoordinated
and unauthorized development activities.
NGOs are by instinct jealous of their
autonomy and so frequently resist even
legitimate government interest in their
work.
Suspicious of officials' motives
and convinced that government efforts
are generally ineffective, NGOs resist
submitting the detailed reports required
by the government.
The most resistant
national NGO leaders seem to ·be those
who have come out of government
service, or who have specific reasons to
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interpret
government
attempts to control NGOs.

actions

as

An insight into NGO attitudes towards
government
involvement
in
their
affairs is provided by the debate within
the NGO consortium, CCA-ONG in Mali
over
whether
government
officials
should be invited to sit on a CCA-ONG
committee
that
makes
decisions
concerning
small
scale
grants.
Although the proposal called for just one
government seat on a large committee
that included other non-NGO people, and
although
those
proposing
this
arrangement took pains to point out that
the government could not control the
committee's decisions, an acrimonious
three-hour debate ensued.
Speaker after
speaker denounced the potential evils of
allowing the government this foot in the
door of NGO affairs, even as others halfhumorously noted that the government
had an absolute right to close down any
national NGO at a moment's notice with
no possible appeal.
Most government-NGO conflicts boil
down to issues of control, control over
the donor resources that governments
now see diverted to NGOs, and control
over the development agenda.
Cases of
expelling external NGOs or refusing
registration to national NGOs are rare.
In Burkina Faso the unit charged with
controlling NGOs is the Bureau de Suivi
des
Organisations
Nongouvernementales, BSONG. In seeking to
control the dynamic NGO community, the
Malian government has tried several
different mechanisms, most recently
creating the Secretariat Technique de
Coordination des Organisations Nongouvernementales.
NGO activity in the
Gambia is nominally coordinated by
loosely
formed
organization
called
ACCNO, Advisory Committee for the
Coordination of NGOs, but it has not met
in several years.
In Niger, which has
the most rigid framework for NGOs,
official control is exercised through a
demanding
initial
registration
procedure and a detailed system of
approval at local, regional and national
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Some recent events in Senegal illustrate
actions
and
responses
between
governments and NGOs.
In 1989 the
Senegalese government issued a decree
setting out NGO intervention procedures,
including the reporting requirements,
coordination
plans
and
the
government's intention to visit NGOs and
require them to account for their
operat10ns.
To apply this decree new
NGO observation units were to be
established at the level of departmental
and regional development committees.
The NGO consortium in Senegal, CONGAD,
worked hard as an intermediary between
government and NGOs to convey NGO
concerns and government intentions.
Many NGOs took this decree to be another
attempt to control them.
This sentiment
was only reinforced when a government
restructuring
in
1990
transferred
oversight of NGOs from the Ministry of
Social Affairs to the Ministry of the
Interior.
Some observers took this to
indicate more concern for security than
development
(Republique du Senegal
1989a).
The
conflicts
in
government-NGO
relations should not mask other, more
positive aspects of their relationship.
On
certain levels, NGOs are increasingly
included in governmental deliberations,
especially in areas where NGOs' expertise
could be useful.
On one level, NGOs
influence on policy is formal.
In Niger,
for
example,
during
the
current
governmental effort to develop a new
Code Rurale, leaders of NGOs have been
asked to comment on drafts of the
proposed code which covers such vital
areas as tenure. In 1990 in Burkina Faso,
NGOs were apportioned ten seats at the
convention that developed the new
national constitution.
In technical
areas, NGO participation is sought,
especially
on
national
committees
coordinating activities in which NGOs
are involved.
Although this is not yet
common, it has started to occur.
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On another level NGO influence is
informal.
The western educated class in
Sahelian countries is very small and
thoroughly
inter-connected.
Great
debates take place in social settings
among members of this intellectual
grouping
who
happen
to
be
in
government, university, NGO or private
employ.
Ties of family, village and
school
often
run
deeper
than
institutional affiliations.
If NGO leaders
are well known, if their families arc well
respected, if their school classmates or
home town friends are well placed,
problems can be handled and policies
can be affected by means totally
unavailable to outsiders.
As one
Sahelian NGO expert put it, "African
administrations secrete subtle paths
along which only their sons can venture
without
getting
lost.
Thus,
the
representatives of local NGOs steeped in
the
prevailing
politico-social
environment, are better able to find
their way and to emerge unscathed from
the brambles"
(Sawadogo).
One other positive area of governmcntNGO relations takes place on local and
regional levels when NGOs involve
government
technical
personnel
in
their activities.
Often marginalized by
big parastatal projec~s. and chronically
short of transportation and supplies,
these technicians find in NGOs the
means to travel to rural communities and
a framework that needs their skills.
NG Os
also
gain
expertise
that
complements
their
community
organizing
skills.
Such
working
arrangements, if more widely practiced,
might have the secondary effect of
bridging the distance and disjuncturc
that typify the relationship between
government extension agents and rural
populations.
Unfortunately many NGOs
still do not negotiate for such services
(Mercoiret).
In many situations NGO resistance to
local government coordination attempts
is counterproductive. Although one can
appreciate
the
NGOs'
desire
for
independence of action, integration of

NGO activities with local government
administrative and technical personnel
is in the long run interest of the local
communities.
In general, national NGOs consider their
position vis-a-vis their governments to
be tenuous. They do not yet enjoy a
guaranteed, recognized place in civil
society.
Governments tend to act as if
NGOs were a resource to be controlled,
rather
than
a
legitimate
socioprofessional
segment
of
society.
National
NG Os do not enjoy the
protection of a foreign
diplomatic
mission.
They seem constantly aware of
the possible accusation of attempting to
undermine
government
programs
or
policies.
External NGOs do not suffer
from such direct concerns, but they too
keep a watchful eye on changes in
government
practices.
When
the
government clamps down on an NGO for
some alleged violation, when a ministry
official suddenly demands adherence to a
previously
ignored
requirement,
or
when an NGO vehicle is commandeered
by the military, word passes quickly.
Concern
for
solidarity
vis-a-vis
governments is one of the principle
reasons for NGO consortia, which are
discussed in the NGO solidarity section.
Governments

rural

organizations

As indicated by repeated attempts to
organize
rural
populations,
governments understand the importance
of mobilizing rural populations, but they
appear
willing
to
sacrifice
developmental goals for political ones.
Governments seem to take the safer, if
less productive path of building sterile,
top-down
local
organizations
rather
than allowing or encouraging dynamic,
sci [-determined structures among the
rural population.
Regardless of whether
post-colonial governments have socialist
or capitalist leanings, the tendency has
been to exercise control over economic,
political and social structures, from
cooperatives to political parties to
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women's organizations.
this tendency.

Niger illustrates

Over the last fifteen years the Niger
government has attempted to create an
integrated
system
for
popular
participation
in
development
which
links village-level groups and Village
Development Councils, through various
levels of government to a National
Council for Development. However good
intentioned were the designers of this
system
called
the
Societe
de
Developpement, the impos1t10n of a
uniform
framework
for
local
organizations throughout the country
has
prevented
local
people
from
evolving institutions tailored to their
particular local circumstances.
This
corporative
structure
and
the
controlling
mentality
of
Nigerien
government officials have not only
rendered the Societe de Developpement
marginally effective in rural resource
management,
but
its
continued
preeminence as the officially sponsored
national development institution has
probably stiffled the emergence in
Niger of dynamic, autonomous ROs
(Charlick;
Johnson
and ·Johnson;
Thomson).
Beginning in the 1970s, the Sahel
experienced a quantum increase in the
number of ROs.
The reactions of
governments to the new wave of rural
organizations differs widely.
In general,
statutes and legal texts relating to ROs
are non-existent or inadequate, making
it difficult for ROs to operate and evolve
(OECD 1989).
Senegal and Burkina Faso seem to be the
least restrictive.
In the early 1980s,
Senegal created a new, simple and
flexible kind of organization called a
groupement d'interet economique, GIE,
economic interest group, which allows
two or more people to set up and register
quickly with the government.
Many
GIEs have been established, from modest
rural community groups to sizeable
partnerships.
The catch is that the

registration fee to form a GIE may be
beyond the reach of many poor people.
different
kind
of
organization
A
sanctioned
by
the
Senegalese
government is
the
'groupement de
promotion feminine', GPF, which have
spread rapidly as part of a government
action plan in support of women.
Some
GPFs manage their own activities and
finances; others function in various
forms of cooperation with ROs. GPFs and
village level entities based on sectoral
initiatives of government and regional
development projects, such as
the
primary health care committee, the soil
management
committee,
and
the
committee to manage water supply,
sometimes create confusion and lack of
integration in community life.
ROs in
general have no recognized status with
government
sanctioned
community
structures.
Likewise, they have no
official relationship to the elected Rural
Councils that have slowly spread across
the country as part of the national
decentralization reform begun in 1972.
From the standpoint of communities with
active, community-initiated ROs it makes
sense to give ROs an integrated place on
the Rural Councils which are typically
controlled by elder, land-owning males.
One proposal from a recent seminar on
the role of peasants in the development
process was that one-third of the places
on Rural Councils be set aside for RO
representatives in recognition of their
socio-economic importance (Ba;
Ba, et.
al.).
As noted above, in the 1970s Burkina's
government encouraged the launching
of
quasi-independent
ROs
called
groupements
villageoises,
although
many subsequently foundered without
any outside assistance.
During the four
years that Thomas Sankara was in power
following the 1983 military coup, a
system of community-level Committees
for the Defence of the Revolution, CDRs,
With
was set up across the country.
supposedly elected officers and ·open
membership,
CD Rs
carried
out
government directives, organized labor
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parties and served as channels for
official information.
Armed to defend
the revolution, CDRs created new power
structures in virtually every community
as a direct challenge to pre-existing
power structures.
In 1988 CDRs were
disbanded
and
replaced
by
Revolutionary Committees, with less of a
security
role.
The populist
and
decentralization goals of the Sankara era
are now muted.
In this highly complex
political
situation,
amid
evolving
government
sanctioned
rural
organizing efforts, independent ROs
continue
to
function
(Baxter
and
Somerville).
For several post-colonial governments
in the Sahel, part of their strategy to
channel
and
manipulate
rural
development has been. to take advantage
of pre-existing social units.
In Mali, the
concept of a grouping called the .lQ.1l has
been
coopted
by
the
state,
and
transformed into a legal entity.
These
official 'tons' are now limited one per
village and are potentially imposed on
ethnic groups across Mali that never had
the concept of a ton before. Likewise, in
Niger the customary youth groups called
samariya were coopted into the Socictc
de Developpement structure.
Niger
recently seems to ba liberalizing its
approach
to
independent
local
institutions,
although
the
rural
populations will need a lot of assistance
to understand that such possibilities exist
and to feel free to take advantage of
them (Painter; OECD 1989).
In at least one CILSS member nation,
Guinea-Bissau, there has not been any
statute allowing legal recognition of
independent associations.
Groups of
veterans who fought for independence
in West Africa's only real war of colonial
liberation have been pushing for the
right to organize since independence in
1974.
At first this demand for the right
of autonomous organizations was defcred
as a matter of socialist orientation.
In
recent years it appears to be a victim of
turf
battles
among
government

ministries, with the rural
the losers (Galli and Jones).

populations

Gauging the attitudes of ROs towards
governments is difficult, particularly as
there are few comprehensive studies of
rural organizations in the Sahel.
One
clear, if indirect indication of the
attitudes of rural populations' towards
governments' attempts to create and
control local institutions has already
been noted in the failure of officially
organized
cooperative
movements.
Peasants voted with their feet in
avoiding these imposed structures.
A glimpse of the attitudes of RO leaders
was provided by the CILSS/Club du Sahel
regional conference on management of
village lands and resources in Segou,
Mali,
in
1989.
While
donor
representatives
and
government
officials
hamme·red
out
acceptable
wording on the decentralization of
authority and the importance of rural
populations taking responsibility, the RO
leaders in attendance made bold, direct
suggestions.
Why not retain local
control over some of the tax money
collected in each community for the
people to set their own priorities and
manage their own projects?
Could
donors put their resources directly at the
disposal of ROs?
Why not make the
technical
assistance
personnel
of
government,
such
as
agricultural
extension agents, directly responsible to
the people they are meant to serve?
Could certain community-sanctioned ROs
take charge of local management of
natural resources according to local
norms and needs?
Without
using
or
knowing
the
vocabulary of decentralization, these RO
leaders were proposing a variety of
devolved and privatized solutions.
In the
report of the Scgou conference the ROs'
logic for demanding autonomy was
quoted as follows. "The work we do is
actually for the country, and in fact we
are the country." (OECD 1989).
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Under pressure of debt and structural
adjustment there has been a broad, if
slow, disengagement of governments
from the rural sector.
While some
governments can be credited
with
allowing the creation of autonomous
rural associations, most have not done so
Despite the emergence
with enthusiasm.
of farmers' organizations and increasing
NGO
support
for
them,
a
new
relationship of trust with governments
has not yet developed.
A recent study
published by CILSS/Club du Sahel finds
governments far from forthcoming in
the face of new rural structures. "What
is ocurring is a forced withdraw! of the
Sahel governments, not a voluntary
move to replace top-down development
structures
with
a
new
type
of
organization
and
new
farmer/government
relationship."
(Snrech).
NGOs - Rural Organizations
NGOs have played a major part in the
current
expansion
of
rural
organizations in the Sahel. NGOs have
worked hard in many cases to assist the
evolution of local groups. There has also
been a proliferation of ROs in some areas
with the expectation that this would
attract NGOs looking for local partners.
Since the early years of independence, a
handful of NGO training institutions
have played an important role in
preparing thousands of farmers in the
Sahel. INADES was cited already. CESAO,
the Centre d'Etudes Economique et
Sociales de l'Afrique de l'Ouest training
center in Burkina Faso is another.
Now
training of rural leaders is a normal part
of most NGO projects. 75% of the NGOs in
Senegal list training as one of their
services (Booth and Ly).
NGOs provide other types of support to
ROs as well.
One is technical assistance
in the form of an engineer to design a
small dam, or a soil conservation expert ·
to
suggest
anti-erosion
techniques.

Organizational assistance to help with
planning or advice on financial matters
is common. NGOs often assist ROs with
grants or small loan funds. Finally, NGOs
may provide some political assistance to
ROs, such as help with government
registration or a kind of protection from
intimidation and control by local or
regional elites whose own interests may
be inimical to self-organized
local
communities.
Unlike NGO movements in parts of Latin
America and Asia, NGOs in the Sahel
have not generally been involved in
political consciousness raising
with
rural populations, especially not on the
basis of class analysis. The limitation on
freedom of expression and freedom of
organization
imposed
by
the
authoritarian
nature
of
Sahelain
governments is a major factor in this.
Also, African NGOs' dependency on
outside funding sources, as well as the
newness of the NGO movement have
probably lessened the potential for such
ideological discourse.
This is not to
denegrate significant work done by NGOs
in
such
areas
as
legal
services,
improvement of women's condition, and
advocacy for local commuities' needs.
Perhaps it is only in international
forums that NGOs have been at liberty to
take strong positions on issues like
political
freedom
and
structural
adjustment programs (Mulyungi;
ECA).
Perhaps the most severe critique of NGOs
in terms of their relations with ROs is
that many NGOs do not, use genuinely
participatory approaches when working
with rural populations.
Rushed by lack
of
time
or
money,
ignorant
of
participatory methodologies, or simply
unwilling to cede· control of the
development process to their would-be
beneficiaries, NGOs may fail to practice
the empowerment they preach.
This
charge has often been leveled against
external development agencies, but it
applies to both foreign and national
NGOs.
Like other members of the
western educated classes, Sahelian NGO
leaders
are
victims
of
inherited
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autocratic models of leadership and
elitist attitudes towards rural society.
This is a legacy they must struggle to
overcome in order to forge more
equitable partnerships with ROs and
communities.
While
not
an
insurmountable problem, it is one that
deserves far more attention than it is
generally given.
In the extreme, in terms of NRM, NGOs
may become part of the problem of rural
communities if they insist of pursuing
external models of organization instead
of recogmzmg and reinforcing the
capacities of existing local management
institutions.
Where new structures arc
necessary they should evolve from a
process of "invention" with the resource
users involved.
When an NGO is not
promoting endogenous development, it
risks
undercutting
community
structures and it risks becoming little
more than
a conduit
for outside
resources (Djibo, et. al.).
This issue underscores the importance of
strengthening
community
structures
and ROs as ends in themselves, rather
than simply as vehicle to accomplish
project objectives.
Consultation with ROs
or communities is not the same as ROs or
communities setting ihc agenda.
This
does not imply that NGOs must reinforce
village structures regardless of whether
they are representative of the entire
community.
Simply working through
the cheiftancy and community notables
is often an inadequate method for
reaching
unrepresented
classes
or
groups.
For example,
targeted
organizing techniques are required in
planning development activities meant
to involve youth, women, displaced
families, ethnic minont1es, members of
ex-captive castes or others who arc left
out
of
the
typical
patriarchal
gerentocracy
of many communities.
However,
NGOs
may
shortcut
the
painstaking steps of encouraging noncustomary
leadership
in
favor
of
approaching the visible village leaders
for cooperation.
NGOs seem more and

more sensitive to these issues and new
approaches are evolving.

of practical research which is
needed (Vincent and Campbell).

One result of not working enough on
strengthening independent ROs is the
phenomenon
of
dependent
rural
organizations which are created within
the framework of an NGO's project for
the express purpose of accomplishing its
own goals. These ROs may function well
during the life of project, but with the
departure of the external supporting
organizations, the rural structures may
collapse.
For
example,
village
development committees established by a
child sponsorship
NGOs may have
difficulty converting themselves into
truly
self-directed,
self-defined
institutions (Ba).

NGOs have begun to solidify their own
institutional base and to become more
sophisticated in their own conception of
self-reliant development.
They are
coming to
an
awareness of their
symbiotic relationship with autonomous
ROs. It is in their own long term interest
Let
to encourage independent partners.
us tum now to a consideration of mutual
support within the NGO community.

The problems of promoting ROs that are
autonomous pertain to external NGOs, to
national NGOs, missionaries, government
services, foreign volunteers, and anyone
supporting such local groups.
National
NGOs are typically managed by urbanbased leaders, who often share with
foreign NGOs a short-term programming
focus that docs not give high priority to
strengthening RO independence.
Donors
may
exacerbate
the
problem
by
requiring quick and quantifiable results
from
their
funding,
without
great
concern for local institution building.
Even with these shortcomings, NGOs
have been a lifeline to many ROs,
supplying them with their only link to
outside technical assistance, funding and
solidarity
Some
NGOs,
notably
Innovations
et
Reseaux
pour
le
Developpement,
IRED,
Development
Innovations and Networks, have made
the strengthening of local associations
their major activity.
IRED now works
with ROs and with associations of local
groups in most Sahelian countries.
It
also has developed written materials for
self-taught institutional strengthening.
In
collaboration
with
the
Ford
Foundation
and
the
International
Development
Research
Institute
of
Canada, IRED is doing a field study of ROs
in four West African countries, the kind
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5. Solidarity
Consortia

among

NGOs:

sorely

NGO

Given the complex and still novel
position of NG Os in Sahelian society,
these agencies have exhibited strong
tendencies to group together for mutual
support and protection.
One reason for
this is the historic and continuing
dependency of national NGOs on their
external counterparts for funding and
technical assistance.
Over 90% of
national NGOs in Senegal count on
funding from outside the country, the
main source of which is from northern
non-governmental
organizations.
Another reason is the need for NGOs to
speak with one voice to governments in
negotiating the terms and conditions for
NGO registration and operation.
Another
reason is simply the long-standing habit
of voluntary organizations to exchange
experiences
and
cooperate.
NGO
consortia offices are also useful simply
as a physical meeting place where
northern and southern NGOs can meet
and work together as equals (Booth and
Ly).
One resource for the emerging national
NGOs are NGO coordinating bodies that
now function to various degrees in most
Sahelian countries.
These include le
Groupement des Aides Privees (GAP) in
Niger,
le Secretariat Permanent des
Organisations
N on-gou vernemen tales
(SPONG) in Burkina Faso, le Conseil des
Organ is ati on s
Non- gou v e rncmen tales
d'Appui au Dcveloppcmcnt (CONGAD) in

Senegal, and TANGO, The Association of
NGOS in the Gambia. In Guinea-Bissau
Solidami, a quasi-governmental body,
coordinates and supports NGO activities.
These NGO groupings provide different
services to their members, and each
reflect the character of the NGO
community in their country.
For
example, in Niger there were very few
national NGOs until recently and GAP
was essentially a club of northern NGOs
for most of its existence. Now 14 of its 30
members are national NGOs and in 1991 it
elected a Nigerien President. In Senegal,
where
NG Os
are
particularly
independent, CONGAD's role focuses on
managing information exchange and on
discussions
with
the
government,
although it has other functions as well.
SPONG, which was over-shadowed for
several
years
by
the
government's
coordinating body, BSONG, has recently
become revitalized by its members.
Perhaps the most dynamic of the
Sahelian NGO consortia at this time, and
the one we will use as a small case study,
is Comite de Coordination des Actions des
Organisations Non-gouvernementales au
Mali, CCA-ONG.
As noted earlier, CCA-ONG was started by
concerned development workers during
the drought emergency of the early
1980's. It was then known as CCAU,
Comite de
Coordination des Aides
d'Urgence.
As NGO participants were its
most active members, CCAU took on the
characteristics of an ad hoc
NGO
grouping.
Soon CCAU became the
conduit for considerable relief activity.
Despite
strong
anti-bureaucratic
tendencies, it began to take institutional
form as it filled many needs.
It was an
informal
tra101ng
ground
for
unemployed young graduates hoping for
jobs in development.
It acted as a
referral service for the endless stream
of missions from foreign donors and
NGOs, and it was the Bamako gathering
point for delegations of rural Malians
seeking cooperation.
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By 1985 the emergency was subsiding,
and
the
funding
along
with
it.
Nonetheless, NGOs had experienced the
benefits of cooperation, had developed a
network of relations with community
groups in drought affected areas, and
had seen the emergence of an national
NGO movement. They decided to form a
consortium which in 1986 became CCAONG.
In addition to the more or less standard
NGO consortium activities of information
exchange and coordination vis-a-vis the
government, CCA offers its members a
range of other services.
Beginning with
donated trucks and other vehicles driven
across the Sahara during the drought,
CCA now
provides an inexpensive
transportation
rental
service
to
its
members. This is especially useful to the
newer, smaller NGOs that could not
otherwise move materials and people
around the vast interior of Mali.
CCAONG also cooperates directly with NGO
support programs and Solidarite-CanadaSahel is housed in its compound.
CCA-ONG has also tackled one of the most
difficult and potentially divisive issues
faced by NGO consortia:
whether and
how to manage grant funds on behalf of
donor organizations. . Building on the
successful
experiences
facilitating
grants to NGOs and community groups
during the early 1980's drought, CCA-ONG
recently established
the Cellule d'Appui
Technique
et
Financier,
CATF,
a
Technical and Financial Support Unit.
The
unit's
staff
and
management
committee currently handles funds on
behalf of Band-Aid. It also handles CCAONG's relationship with the PYO-NGO
Natural Resource Management Support
Project, PYO-NGO NRMS. CAFT could be a
conduit for other resources from donors
and
support
projects,
as
such
possibilities develop (CCA-ONG 1990).
Frequently CCA-ONG co-hosts training
programs, workshops and seminars for
NGO leaders.
Two examples include the
NGO Management Training program it
jointly sponsored with Private Agencies

Collaborating Together, PACT, and the
"Survival
in
the
Dry lands"
Africa
regional
NGO
workshop
with
International Institute for Environment
and Development, IIED. This latter event
in 1988 has led to an on-going Task Force
of Dryland NGOs.
In coordinating such
learning and exchange opportunities
CCA-ONG has had to be careful to limit its
role, both to avoid competing with
member NGOs that specialize in training
and to avoid spreading itself too thin.
Among its innovative activities, CCAONG's central task has always been
information exchange.
Huge bulletin
boards are full of news as is the weekly
newsletter. Every Wednesday, NG Os' staff
members gather after work hours to
study special topics. Four years ago CCA0 NG
launched
a
computerized
information service for the analysis and
treatment of information.
SIS, the
Systcme d'Information du Sahel has now
spread to three other NGO consortia in
Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal, with
possible
extensions
to
Chad
and
Mauritania.
Its various data bases
provide NGOs, governments, researchers,
donors and others with information on
NGOs, projects, technical matters and
funding sources.
Five years after its founding, CCA-ONG is
both strong and fragile.
With the
explosion of new Malian NGOs in recent
years it has grown from a handful of
founders to over 80 NGO members.
Consortium members became aware of
the importance of good leadership when
an authoritarian board chairman caused
great dissension before he was forced to
resign.
The possibility also exists of
increased government surveillance, as
CCA-ONG's successes make it more visible,
and its new CAFT programs increase its
liability.
What makes the consortium
strong is an absolute commitment to
democratic
procedures
and
the
continuing perception of its members
that the consortium is worth their
investment in time and energy.
The
vigilant participation of its members is
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the only
vitality.

6.

assurance

Natural

of

Resource

its

continued

Management

The major actors selected for this study
and their relationships are now better
known.
We tum to face more squarely
how these actors are working on local
level management of natural resources.
To do this we will briefly review some
aspects of governments' approaches, and
also consider certain theoretical and
practical trends in NRM.
We will then
concentrate on the contributions of NGOs
and their partner ROs.
Principle
observations are that the situation calls
for creative experimentation in both
technical and institutional areas, and
that NGOs are providing considerable
leadership in these areas.
Governments
Management

and

Natural

Resource

One must bear in mind the direct linkage
of today's policies to the conquering
mindset of the colonial power.
That
centralizing authority declared itself
proprietor of the Sahel's resources,
returning only use rights to local
communities from which it planned to
extract a surplus of primary materials.
Its legacy to the national elites who
succeeded it as rulers of artificially
demarcated nations was a subjugated
population controlled by administrators,
military and police.
After independence in 1960, levels of
state control that a thinly spread
colonial administration could only exert
in principle, such as making and
enforcing regulations on local resource
use, were rapidly exceeded by the
burgeoning national bureaucracies. The
growth and integration of the modern
Sahelian states allow them to claim and
exercise more effectively the unique
right to define and enforce rules

governing the use of natural
in the public domain.

resources

populations have decreased incentives
for compliance with either code.

Since title property ownership under
modern law is virtually unknown in the
rural areas, most land and resources are
considered part of the public domain.
There is government intervention in the
areas of taxation, collection of fines,
issuing of permits and resolution of
major disputes. Micro-management of
many local resources, however, remains
beyond administrative reach.
At this
level, fragments or whole elements of
customary regimes of resource control
have continued de facto. In part, this is
a result of the governments' distance
from scattered· commun1t1es in rural
areas. It is also due to the high costs in
time, energy and money for local
resource users of legally changing or
challenging
existing
management
arrangements that remain partially in
place (Thomson).

Governments, assisted by donors, have
also intervened in local resources use
regimes by changing the configuration
of resource availability.
Such was the
case in the 1960s and 1970s when
thousands of new boreholes were drilled
in grasslands where no waterpoints
previously existed.
No rule systems were
in place for the intensive use of
rangelands near these new waterpoints
that suddenly became available for
grazing.
Pastoralist groups historically
own and manage wells and so controlled
adjacent grazing areas.
Yet, none of
these user groups could exercise even
customary control rights over these new
boreholes that governments installed
without range management policies and
regulations.
The result
in many
locations is massive overgrazing around
these "open access" waterpoints
(Otto
1990).

In the area of enforcement, however,
the modern state often comes into
conflict
with
pre-existing
resource
management regimes.
A typical case is
the supression by government forestry
services
of
local
community
enforcement of customary penalties in
forestry management.
Groups whose
customary forest use rights have been
violated must appeal based on modern
law to distant forestry agents, who in
tum will keep all or most of the fines
they impose, if indeed an accurate
determination of guilt is made. Not only
are fines and permits a major source of
official revenue; in Mali salary bonuses
for forestry agents are calculated on the
level of fines they collect. This perverse
arrangement creates strong incentives
to impose fines as often as possible and to
interdict the competing enforcement
regimes
of
customary
resource
governance structures.
As a result of
continual and seemingly arbitrary fines
by officials for forestry use, and the
concomitant
destructuring
of
preexisting regimes for control, rural
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The consequence of these superimposed
tenurial frameworks is a chaotic and
insecure scene in rural areas.
Some
resources
previously
managed
as
"common property" have been placed in
the unregulated, free-for-all category of
open access resources.
For rural
producers of all types, the lack of secure
rights to the resources they use is a
serious disincentive to invest in long
term improvement.
Women are perhaps more vulnerable
than all other resource users. They have
found that they may actually lose the
right to use certain lands if they make
improvements, such as planting fruit
trees, and thereby increase the value of
the property.
Similar fate has befallen
stranger farmers whose improvement of
land allocated to them on a temporary
basis may be taken as an attempt to
establish ownership.
The role that governments take in local
level NRM is not uniformly negative. An
increasing number of examples can be
found of government services and their

agents supporting community initiatives
at improved NRM.
A recent study on
decentralization in Mali provides case
studies.
In one community near Kayes
on the Senegal River agents of the
Service des Eaux et Forets, Water and
Forestry Agency, now back up the
village's new woodstock management
arrangements, and have sanctioned the
local
fishermen's
management
institutions.
In another community,
where protecting pastures from dry
season bush fires is a major NRM issue,
government
agencies
have
been
supportive of the local Bush Fire Control
Committee.
The Office du Niger, a
colonial era parastatal agency that has
managed a 55 ,000 hectare irrigation
scheme for almost 60 years, is now
changing its relationship with local
communities in one sector.
Relaxing of
the parastatal's monopoly is allowing
local men's and women's groups to play a
role in rice milling and marketing as
well as farming (Djibo, et. al.).
In another example the World Bank
financed the Eastern Senegal Livestock
Development Project.
Over fifty grazing
associations of pastoralists were formed
to re-establish local management control
of about a million hectares of grasslands
under special legislation that granted
long term rights to the associations. One
more example, this one involving an
NGO, is the experimental project in
natural
forest
management
near
Niamey, the Forest and Land Use
Planning Project.
As part of a carefully
worked out management plan involving
a variety of user groups, the US NGO
Cooperative League of the USA, CLUSA,
assisted
nine
villages
to
form
a
cooperative that negotiated with the
Niger government for the right to
control firewood cutting and grazing
permits in the National Forest of
Guesselbodi.
The Guesselbodi experience
has since led several NGOs to attempt
replication projects in other national
forests
(Bromley
and
Cernea;
Heermans).
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In some cases NGOs have managed, often
with donor support, to negotiate waivers
on some government regulations that did
not involve legislative or jurisdictional
changes.
Two example from Niger
concern NGOs' negotiation of a waivers
of the forestry code regulation against
mutilating planted trees.
This was
necessary in one case because repeated
trimming is required to develop thick
living hedges, and in the other because
coppicing of windbreak trees is a
regenerative technique for harvesting
wood.
The documents describing these
examples from Senegal, Mali and Niger
have several common threads.
They all
put strong emphasis on the key element
of supporting the development of local
institutions
that
are
capable
of
managing the resources in question.
In
addition, they point out the essential
government
role
of
creating
or
sanctioning jurisdictional structures or
granting the legal permissions that in
turn give secure rights to the resource
user groups (Djibo, et. al.; Bromley and
Cernea;
Heermans).
Such examples, few as they may be at
this
point,
confirm
Sahelian
governments' interest in exploring ways
of reducing financial and administrative
burdens for local resource management.
However, it would be a mistake to
exaggerate these tentative and highly
situational
cases
of
governments
negotiation and empowerment of local
level resource user institutions.
While
some important pioneering efforts point
the way to reforming the Sahel's
complex NRM systems, the tasks of
government
restructuring
and
local
institution strengthening loom large
indeed.
To consider the possibilities for
such a transfer of responsibility and
authority,
we
turn
to
recent
developments in conceptualizing NRM in
the future.

Current trends
Management

in

Natural

Resource

In looking at NRM realities, we will first
present a conceptual approach to the
problems of the existing situation, and
then see how current programs are
dealing with NRM.
The hopeful element
in this review is that a program
approach has recently evolved m the
Sahel that may allow more forthright
reflection
and
action
on
these
intractable issues.
What is more and more recognized as a
way out of this ambiguous mix of
authority are negotiated institutional
arrangements, guaranteed by the state,
that secure resource use rights for all
the various parties involved.
This is the
re-privatization
of
local
resource
management referred to earlier.
The
scale and scope of such arrangements
depend on the resource or resources to
be managed.
For example, each plot or
field within a large irrigated perimeter
is most appropriately controlled by the
immediate production unit, perhaps a
family or a group of farmers.
A
management committee representing all
production units might best deal with
problems affecting the whole irrigated
perimeter.
Still larger units may be
needed to coordinate efforts on the level
of the entire watershed, or to control and
maintain a dam if there is one (Thomson;
Painter).
According to this perspective on natural
resource
management,
interrelated
governance structures and regimes at
appropriate levels must be created, or, in
cases where they already exist outside
the legal framework, _must be recognized
legally.
Such regimes will provide
secure access to multiple and potentially
competing users of renewable resources
(Thomson).
Local and regional governance systems
will involve a multiplicity of institutions
with specific domains, and so will not be
strictly hierarchical.
They certainly
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will not be standardized, as they must be
designed for multifarious situations.
To
conceptualize this, one might consider
that the debate is not principally
between centralized and decentralized
options.
More complex, institutional
arrangements arc needed which arc
non-central.
These arrangements of
complementary scopes and sizes might
be
termed
polycentric
(Ostrom,
Schroeder and Wynne).
Once
re-privatization
of
local
governance is achieved, and this is still a
hypothetical prospect at this point, the
role of the state will be chiefly that of
guarantor.
This includes assuring that
local
resource
use
agreements
arc
respected
and
providing
final
arbitration
when
other
conflict
resolution
mechanisms
fail.
To
accomplish this, centralized power must
become dcconccntratcd and devolved so
spatially
dispersed,
govcrnmcntsanctioncd bodies endowed with the
required authority are congruent with
the
local
user-based
governance
structures.
With this vision in mind, we
turn to view what is happening in
program activities relating to NRM.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the
governments and their. donors developed
a new kind of regional approach to
agricultural
productivity
called
integrated
rural
development,
IRD.
Typically organized in large zones of
operation, IRD projects offered standard
packages
of
so-called
improved
production
techniques,
plus
other
activities
like
literacy,
cooperative
development, and economic activities for
women.
IRD projects were not really
integrated and often failed to produce
significant increases
in productivity
when
few
producers
adopted
the
proffered packages.
In part, these
projects failed because they did not take
into
account
the
actual
zone
of
operation, the varied income-producing
activities and the risk adverse strategics
of rural producers.
In most cases rural
producers had little if any input into the
design of IRD projects.
The 1983-1985

drought period led to a rethinking and a
search
for
approaches
that
would
combine
conserving
the
natural
resource
base
with
improving
agriculture (Painter; Otto, et. al.).
From this rethinking, a new approach
has
emerged
in
the
mid-1980s,
articulated in large part through a series
of CILSS/Club
du
Sahel
regional
meetings. It is a rural development
strategy known as Amenagement des
Terroirs
or
Gestion
des
Terroirs
Villageoises,
improvement
or
management
of village
lands
and
resources, which might be abbreviated
AT/GT.
The spatial basis for AT/GT
interventions is the area that a given
agrarian community uses for growing
and gathering food
and for other
livelihood
purposes,
the
terroir
villageois.
AT/GT is a global approach,
concerned
witti
the
complex
relationships of resources, their uses
and their users.
It is multisectoral and
integrated in that it attempts to take into
account all aspects of peasant production
systems.
AT/GT
is
participatory,
stressing the importance of active inputs
and voluntary action on the part of rural
producers.
(Painter)
An approach that is still evolving, AT/GT
has its flaws.
It can be biased against
transhumant pastoralists whose annual
zone
of
activity
includes
several
territories far apart from each other
which do not match the concept of
sedentary
village
lands.
Another
problem with the terroir concept is that
it does not recognize the larger "action
space" which peasants exploit beyond
the terroir itself, such as commerce or
hired labor in locations perhaps far
from the community in question.
The
AT/GT approach in practice has often
inaccurately
assumed
socio-economic
homogenaity
in
rural
communities,
whereas the reality of diversity means
differing capacities and interests.
To be
involved in AT/GT requires considerable
knowledge and application of social
science research methods to facilitate
careful collection, analysis and use of
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data in a number of areas. These are not
skills most NGOs have on staff which
implies greater reliance on consulting
social scientists.
Like any program
modality, AT/GT can become diluted or
coopted as
it becomes fashionable
(Painter;
Brown).
Although too new an approach to be
evaluated conclusively, AT/GT appears to
have a lot to offer if it is rigorously and
creatively applied.
Its small physical
scale
presents
the
possibility
of
bringing a critical level of attention and
analysis to bear on specific problems. It
would seem harder to obfiscate or ignore
issues of tenure and resources users'
security when analysis is focused on
terroir villageois.
AT/GT invites sitespecific solutions designed with user
involvement.
AT/GT
reunites
the
parallel
objectives
of
optimum
productivity and sustainable resource
management.
It
highlights
the
fundamental importance of indigenous
knowledge and the ensemble of peasant
production practices.
To the degree that
governments are implicated in AT/GT, its
cornerstone of voluntary involvement
could represents a major, positive shift
of strategy.
NGOs have increasingly attempted to
adopt AT/GT approaches, as it matches
their participatory style and community
level of intervention.
Actually, at this
point it may be more accurate to note
that NGOs are using elements of AT/GT
approaches, as they come to grips with
the
complexity
of this
demanding
methodology.
We turn now to consider
what NGOs have to offer this new
approach and to NRM in general.
NGOs and
activities

natural

resource

management

Remembering
that
NGOs
initially
appeared in the Sahel in a drought relief
mode, one can trace a progression in
their involvement in NRM.
As the
immediate
crisis
subsided,
straight

donations of food and supplies in refugee
camps were replaced
by assistance to
people returning to their homes.
Such
assistance included seeds, tools, deepened
wells and herd replenishment.
A
controversial practice begun in that era
was food for work in which rural
populations were fed in exchange for
working on roads, anti-erosion projects
and other public works. Some NGOs have
continued for a long time in feeding and
nutrition programs, especially relating
to maternal and child health.
A
prominent example is Catholic Relief
Services, which recently made a major
conversion to focus on support of local
institutions after decades of managing
feeding programs.
Early NGO involvement related to NRM
concerned horticulture and other kinds
of food production on one hand, and a
series
of
environmental
protection
activities on the other. At this stage few
NGOs were systematically analyzing or
trying to influence farming systems in
In solving
an integrated fashion.
immediate problems these NGOs often
developed
techniques
that
were
eventually widely replicated.
From soil
conservation and fertility improvement
to stabilizing sand dunes to fuel-efficient
cooking stoves, NGOs have participated
in a number of striking small scale
successes that show promise of having
impact on much larger areas.
NGOs
contribute training and institutional
strengthening for local organizations,
practical research and dissemination of
low-cost techniques in conservation and
productivity,
and
other
hands-on
interventions (Shaikh, et. al.).
The most striking aspect of NGOs' work in
resource management is not what they
do by themselves. On the contrary, NGOs
are most effective when they provide
the
linkages
between
government
services, donors, technical resources,
and the rural people.
Unlike most other
development agencies, NGOs have the
flexible methods and mindset to work on
From this perspective,
a small scale.
NGOs can carry out applied research,
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working with communities on pilot
strategies that may be applied elsewhere
and
have
policy
implications
if
successful (Scott).
Two examples illustrate NGOs' impact on
agricultural
productivity
and
environmental protection.
On the
productivity side is the dry season
gardening program begun by
Lutheran
World Relief, LWR, in Niger in 1976.
Faced with the paramount need for
improved shallow wells, L WR developed a
low cost technology that Nigeriens
quickly learned and diffused.
237 wells
were dug in the original eight sites of
the L WR project.
A number of other
NGOs adopted the techniques so that more
than 3,200 such wells were completed by
1987.
An association of Nigerien well
diggers,
APRN,
l'Association
des
Puisatiers de la Republique du Niger, was
established as an NGO in 1988. APRN is
now annually constructing hundreds of
village and garden wells. The technology
has spread to neighboring countries
(Cottingham;
APRN).
An excellent example of NGO impact on
environmental
protection
(which
ultimately enhances productivity) began
in the 1970s with OXFAM's support to a
soil and water conservation effort in the
Yatenga region of Burkina Faso.
After
several years of participatory research
with local farmers . the technique of
making rock bunds or diguettes was
selected. These low bunds are installed at
intervals along the contour of slightly
sloping fields in order to increase rain
water retention and infiltration on the
hard crusted soil.
One key piece of
appropriate
technology
that
was
introduced was a simple water tube level
to determine the contour line accurately
so that the bunds would maintain the
same altitude across the fields. Unlike
many conservation efforts, no food aid
or cash payments were made.
By 1986
about 1,750 farmers in some 340 villages
had been trained in the use of the water
level and rock bund techniques, and
approximately
2.400
hectares
were
treated with the bunds as of that year.

The techniques have now been spread
far beyond the original project area by
NG Os,
other
organizations
and
spontaneous adoption.
Women have
played a major role in the construction
of bunds, and in some areas autonomous
women's teams of bund builders are
selling their construction services to
other farmers (Bagre;
Monimart; Reij).
The range of NGO involvement in
natural
resource
management
is
indicated by the following sampling of
activities. CARE, an international NGO, is
a leading force in several Sahelian
countries in the areas of NRM research
and
development,
pioneering
and
disseminating
techniques
in
agroforestry
for
soil
and
water
conservation.
In the Mopti region of
Mali several NGOs and the Forestry
Service led by th~ International Union
for the Conservation of Nature publish
and distribute a journal for school
children on environmental issues.
Two
Burkinabe NGOs, SOS Sahel and Sahel
Solidarite, are constructing anti-erosion
check dams and bunds in ravines and
surrounding areas of rapid run-off with
villagers in No and Rounou. Veterinaires
Sans Frontiers, Veternarians without
Borders, is working with Tuareg groups
near Timbuktou on the regeneration of
bourgou
grass,
which
had
almost
disappeared from the shores of the Niger
River (Shaikh, et. al.; NGLS; Schmitt).
Participatory
methodologies
that
reverse the usual top-down framework
of development have been captured in
the concept of farmer first, although
other
labels
include
farmer
participatory research and recherchedevelopment.
This method centers the
research and the analysis on the rural
producer.
The farmer articulates the
priorities,
experiments
and
adapts
technology.
Extension is not imposed
from above but is lateral, from farmer to
farmer.
NGOs have led the way in
farmer first activities in the Sahel. NGOs
have arranged for Malian farmers to
v1s1t
soil
and
water
conservation
activities in Burkina, and for pastoralists
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from Chad to see interesting work in
Senegal.
Groupe de Recherche pour
l'Appui et Autopromotion Paysanne,
GRAAP, based in Burkina Faso have
developed
techniques
to
aid
communities' in their reflection and
analysis of problems.
World Neighbors
built
up
a
network
of
farmerresearchers in Mali who conducted field
trials on short cycle millet and who
eventually managed ·the diffusion of the
best varieties (Toulmin and Chambers).
One of the most exciting techniques in
this methodology, Rapid Rural Appraisal,
RRA, is now getting some circulation in
the Sahel thanks to IIED-London, IDRC,
and several dedicated field workers.
Its
adapted name in French actually more
descriptive
than
RRA,
Methode
Acceleree de Recherche Participative,
accelerated
participatory
research
method.
The RRA approach has also
been
adapted
for
use
in
NRM
participatory
research
(Gue ye
and
Freudenberger; NES, et. al.).
In terms of the thorny issues of security,
tenure,
government
regulations
and
local governance of natural resources,
NGOs have lots of practical experience.
In many of their rural activities these
problems are posed directly.
The
resolution of these problems within local
communities
helps
create
an
experiential base for future user-based
governance of resources.
Examples
abound, like when an NGO is involved in
ass1strng pastoralists improve degraded
pasture lands and finds itself advocating
for priority use by the groups that
invested in the improvements.
Dry season gardening, a common NGOsponsored activity, shows the variety of
tenurial issues that NGOs have faced. For
instance, when NGOs work with a group
of women on an agriculture project,
negotiations must first establish the
women's rights to long term secure use
and to the benefit of their investments.
To initiate a gardening project that
involves drawing irrigation water from
a seasonal pond
that
also serves

pastorali.sts, new agreements must be
negotiated.
Disputes that arise when
foraging animals enter gardens and
destroy produce have led to setting local
rules.
If a gardening project employs
techniques of recession agriculture, i.e.,
progressively extending plots into a
river or lake bed as water levels drop,
such gardens may block established
corridors used to move herds;
again,
NGOs support the groups they work with
to negotiate new arrangements (Otto
1990).
These examples all point out the wide
range of experience NGOs have in
dealing with tenurial problems.
A
recent Club du Sahel mission to Mali
asked CCA-ONG to help assemble NGOs to
get their perceptions on tenure issues.
The researchers were impressed by the
thoughtful contributions from some 33
NGOs that responded (Crowley).
In terms of NGO experiences with use of
the AT/GT approach,
little published
information is as yet widely available. A
Sahel regional NGO conference on this
subject is in the planning stages and will
go a long way towards documenting
developments to date.
Two examples of
NGO use of AT/GT point to the perennial
tension between the long term focus of
AT/GT approach and short term needs of
the
rural
populations.
If
rural
populations are preoccupied with the
problems of survival, a commitment on
the NGO's part to genuine participation
may mean postponing resource use
planning
and
environmental
improvement act1v1t1es that do not have
immediate pay-back.
The Canadain NGO CECI was obliged to put
off detailed studies· in their Pro jet
Amenagement de Terroir in Niger's
Dallol Bosso area in order to meet local
communities'
pressing
demands
for
fertilizer
loans
to
increase
food
production.
The Burkinabe NGO Action
Sahel hoped to work with northern
Yatenga pastoralists on locally-based
management
plan
to
address
the
breakdown
in
long-standing
NRM
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systems.
However, local perceptions of
the overriding need for more income
generating activities led instead to a
different first step:
development of a
Gramene Bank style credit program,
Projet Banque Villageoise.
Confidence
and mutual trust within the local
community and between community and
NGO that develop in such short term
activities (which may in themselves take
years),
will
hopefully
provide
the
relationship
basis
for
jointly
conceptualizing
resource management
on the decade or longer planning
horizon of AT/GT (Painter).
Given the wealth of their experience in
natural resource management, it is vital
that NGOs individually and collectively
deepen their knowledge and improve
their capacities
to
carry
out
the
systematic diagnostic studies required
for AT/GT interventions. Also, NGOs need
to document their work, analyze it, share
it and contribute to the on-going policy
debate as informed partners of rural
organizations, governments and dono~s.
To make the transition to local control of
NRM, all players must act decisively.
Donors and governments must find the
financial resources and the political
will.
Rural resource ·users will have to
organize themselves to take on new
NGOs must be prepared
responsibilities.
to contribute their full share in this
effort.
None of these actors can resolve
the current crisis alone.
7.

Concluding

Remarks

Much as one might wish lo end on a
positive note, probity demands a candid
assessment.
Multi-party elections that
preoccupy a segment of the urban
population in some Sahclian countries
cannot, in themselves, do anything
about the deeper problems of power
distribution over natural resources.
Will
elected governments of urban elites
necessarily
treat
rural
producers
differently than unelected ones have?
Moves
towards
administrative

decentralization, which is only one of
many steps required for local resource
management, has made painfully slow,
uneven progress in even the more
advanced
countries.
Given
that
decentralization
works
best
when
government
legitimacy
and
policy
direction
are well
established, the
unsettled political situation created by
changes
in
national
government
structures
will
probably
not
be
conducive to accelerated transfer of
NRM responsibility and authority.
A comment made about the potential for
meaningful change which was leveled at
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, might well
be applied to other Sahelian states.
"It
appears that the governments ... want it
both ways:
On the one hand they want
more local participation, particularly in
absorbing costs, while on the other hand
governments arc unwilling to effect a
significant devolution of power to the
local level in areas that are critical to
management."
natural
resource
(Painter).
A lot is happening in the Sahel, and it is
difficult to estimate the velocity or final
direction of change while it is ocurring.
One Sahelian NGO leader commenting in
mid-1991, predicted that the Sahel's
political life will be under completely
different management in two year's
time.
It seems unlikely that its natural
resources
will
experience
such
a
transition in management in that time
frame.
Far from an idle waiting period,
this is the time to press ahead with bold
and creative experiments in user-based
resource management, to focus energies
on preparing rural communities and the
organizations they sanction to exercise
management responsibilities.
For the rural producers, a capital city
coup or switch over to ·elections is no
guarantee that they will have more
secure access to resources or a better
price for their surplus.
Major donors
and each national government have
elaborate plans for the rural Sahel, but
which of them calls in unequivocal
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language,
backed
by
specific
investments, for the transformation that
is required to reinstate local level
management of resources?
A lot of
words have been said and written on this
subject,
but
the
Sahelian
proverb
reminds all: A loud noise will chase the
birds but it will not make the millet
grow.
We close with a word of caution to two
sets of actors. Donors, take care lest you
diminish the
creativity,
innovation,
experimentation and independence that
has made NGOs attractive in the first
place.
Mechanistic
concern
for
financial stewardship must not blind you
to other, more important measures of
accomplishment.
Millions spent trying
to get the numbers right on macropolicy reform will not solve the crisis
unless rural producers have the support
to organize themselves, and the hope of
secure resource use.
NGOs, avoid replication of top-down
errors that you correctly diagnose m
others.
When money comes pouring in,
with strings attached, try not to be easily
seduced.
Beware of those who view
development as a competitive business
and who would have you consider donors
or government as your clients.
Guard
your independence, sense of purpose
and
spirit
of
service.
Your
connectedness to other NGOs and to the
rural communities with which you work
are true resources of the movement.
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